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OPERATION ORDERS
FIELD ARTILLERY

LIEUT. COL. HARRY C. BISHOP



OPERATION ORDERS

FIELD ARTILLERY

A Study in the Technique of Battle Orders

BY

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UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

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PREFACE

This work was suggested by the publication, "Battle Orders," by Captain von Kiesling of the German Army, a book which has been used with great success at the Army Service Schools. Von Kiesling's work, however, deals with German units on a difficult foreign map and relates almost wholly to infantry.

The situations herein presented have been worked out repeatedly by officers of all grades during the past two years at Fort Sill in postgraduate school work, target practice, actual maneuvers with troops and in examinations for promotion. They therefore represent the best thought of a large number of officers and it seemed well to put the result of their efforts at the disposal of the field artillery at large.

With "estimates of the situation" and "decisions" this paper has nothing to do. That is a separate study in itself. The decision having been made, this study takes up the work of executing it. Whatever the decision, good, bad, or indifferent, it must be carried out and can only be so carried out by the issue of proper orders all down the line.

In the execution of decisions, this work follows the principles and the technique laid down in the new Drill and Service Regulations for Field Artillery recently prepared by the Field Artillery Board. Units are taken with the organization laid down in the Tables of Organization for the U. S. Army, 1914.

In the preparation of this matter, the writer is indebted to many of the officers of the 5th Field Artillery for valuable suggestion and criticism and to Lieut.-Col. Edward F. McGlachlin, 5th Field Artillery, and Capt. Fox Connor, Field Artillery, for a careful review of the manuscript.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

H. G. B.

June 10, 1916.

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PART I—FIELD ORDERS

THE DECISION

Upon receipt of an order from superior authority and more frequently due to certain circumstances or a combination of circumstances, every officer and non-commissioned officer is confronted with the necessity of making an estimate of the situation and a decision. This decision must be communicated to subordinates with a statement of their duties and it is then their duty to carry out the decision in the manner ordered, departing therefrom only when conditions are found to so differ from those considered by the superior or when such circumstances arise that compliance is inadvisable.

Decisions are not always perfect. Frequently we will be confronted with bad or faulty decisions, decisions with which we do not agree, and for this reason some poor decisions have been purposely introduced into this study. If the decision is not the best, it is all the more reason that its weakness should be remedied, if possible, by perfect execution which primarily requires accurate orders by subordinates. It would be difficult to say which were worse; an excellent decision with faulty orders and correspondingly faulty execution, or a poor decision with excellent orders. In my opinion, success will more often be attained under a faulty decision, decisively announced and unwaveringly carried out by clear and positive orders, than under an excellent decision that fails of execution by reason of faulty orders.

THE ORDER

The following remarks from the preface of Von Kiesling's book "Battle Orders" are applicable to our service—in fact our officers are notoriously weak in this important subject of giving orders.

I have noticed that in all our applicatory work the battle order is less studied than any other. Among our young officers who study tactics at all seriously, there are few who find any difficulty in issuing orders to set a

3. OPERATION ORDERS, FIELD ARTILLERY

division on the march or place it in cantonments; but there are not so many who can give battle orders quickly, from the saddle.

The management of an army grows constantly more complicated, through the introduction of new and improved articles of equipment. To give proper and timely orders for the use of all these things is no easy task; to forget nothing important, and at the same time to keep the orders clear and concise, requires practice. This is what I mean by the expression "technique of orders,"—skill and certainty in giving orders, acquired by deep reflection and constant practice. This must come from one's own experience,—from a carefully formed style, from cultivation of the intellect, from strengthening the will.

According to the field Service Regulations, battle orders must not be hampered by any form. Orders should be given verbally or in writing, according to circumstances,—provided only that they distinctly express the commanding officer's will, assume full responsibility, and overlook no part of the command. The orders will then necessarily be good; excellent, if expressed in emphatic, brief, military language.

While it is essential that subordinates make their minor decisions and issue orders to carry out strictly and loyally the orders of their superiors, the latter owe it to their subordinates to allow them *time* for proper estimation and decision and the issue of orders. Too often the regimental or battalion commander takes his time in formulating his own decision, then hurriedly issues a heterogeneous mass of instructions and becomes impatient if the wheels do not turn at once. Due allowance must be made for time consumed in the transmission of orders, and organizations should be regularly practiced in this work. It is also of the greatest importance that organizations be oriented and kept oriented during a tactical exercise. If this is habitually done, much time may be saved when it becomes necessary to give an order. Without orientation, subordinate leaders can only blindly obey the letter of their orders and coöperation becomes a negligible quantity.

There are many expressions and words in our language which have come to have a technical military meaning, frequently very different from their dictionary meaning. It is essential that they be used and understood in their technical military sense. The following historical example illustrates the dire results from failure to observe three cardinal principles in the giving of field orders:

During the battle of Chickamauga the divisions of Reynolds, Brannon, and J. T. Wood were in line of battle in the above order from right to left. Under the erroneous impression that Brannon's division "had been called away," the Commander-in-chief, General Rosecrans, "told an aide to write General Wood an order to close up on Rosecrans and support him." The aide wrote and sent the following direct to General Wood:

Headquarters
September 20, 10:45 A. M.

Brigadier-General Wood,
Commanding Division.

The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds and support him.

Respectfully,
FRANK S. BOND,
Major, and Aide-de-Camp.

Wood literally obeyed the order by taking his command out of line and marching past the rear of Brannon to Reynolds' right. In this way occurred the gap in the Union line into which Longstreet threw his entire command and defeated the Federal Army.

Disregarding the matter of the erroneous information upon which General Rosecrans acted, and his decision, three cardinal principles of a field order were violated in this order to General Wood, with the result that the Union Army was disastrously defeated.

- (1) He failed to send the order through military channels.
- (2) He misused a common military expression.
- (3) He failed to orient his subordinate.

The commander-in-chief should, ordinarily, send his orders through the corps commander. If he wants a line *prolonged* in a certain direction, he should not use the words "close up" and "support" to express his meaning. The order as sent gave no idea of the general situation, no position of supporting troops, and no correct idea of the mission of General Wood,—all of which are necessary when a man is expected to obey the spirit as well as the letter of an order, and all of which are distinctly provided for in the modern order.

The following are a few of the words and expressions in common use which have a specific technical military meaning and which are frequently misused in orders or not understood when so used.

LOCALITIES

Area: A portion of the terrain assigned to a body of troops for a specified purpose.

Example: The 1st Battalion will camp *in the area* west of the 9-8 road between HILL 1250 and CACHE CREEK.

Sector: The V-shaped portion of the terrain embraced between lines drawn from a designated organization or individual to two other points in the terrain, generally to the front.

Example: The battery (Scout No. 1) will observe the sector MONUMENT HILL—SIGNAL MOUNTAIN.

Zone: A belt of the terrain at right angles to the direction of sight, direction of fire, or direction of motion.

On the line (so and so): An expression used to designate the location of the leading elements of a stationary body of troops.

Example: The battery is *on the line*: TWINS—CONCRETE FORD.

It does not imply motion, thus it would mean nothing to say the battery is advancing *on the line* TWINS—CONCRETE FORD. The battery may advance (retire) *to the line*: TWINS—CONCRETE FORD, or it may advance (retire) *along the line* TWINS—CONCRETE FORD.

On the front (so and so): An expression used to designate the direction of motion of a body of troops. It implies that the troops are not in a single column but have some appreciable frontage.

Examples: The division is advancing (retiring) *on the front*, LAWTON—FT. SILL; the battalion is advancing *on the front*, ARTILLERY RIDGE.

Vicinity of; Near: The context and good tactical sense determine the meaning of these expressions. They are habitually used in orders but admit of no explicit tactical definition.

Right; Left: Of your own troops, they mean your right and left as you face the enemy. Of the enemy, his right and left

when facing you. When not in the presence of the enemy, they are referred to the direction in which the troops or the column faces. They are bad expressions and should be avoided. Substitute for them the points of the compass, except in the case of streams or rivers where, facing down-stream, the right bank is to your right, the left bank to your left.

Front: (a) The direction of the enemy. When not in the presence of the enemy, the direction in which the troops or the column faces. This expression is as bad as *right* and *left* and should be avoided, by substituting the points of the compass.

(b) The space right and left occupied by a body of troops.

INFORMATION

Tactical patrol: A patrol whose mission is to obtain tactical information, for example, the location of a battery; the strength and location of a particular body of troops; the location of a hostile flank. Its size depends upon the circumstances, whether or not it must fight to accomplish its mission, the number of messages it may have to send back, etc.

Strategic patrol: A patrol whose mission is to obtain strategical information, such as the location or direction of motion of large bodies.

Combat patrol: A patrol whose mission is to offer resistance by either defensive or offensive action—usually to guard a flank. Its mission is more security than information.

Officer's patrol: Any patrol commanded by an officer. Strategic patrols are almost habitually commanded by officers.

To patrol: To have sentinels or small patrols move back and forth along a certain line or in a certain area for security purposes.

To send patrols: A much-used expression meaning to inaugurate a reconnaissance by patrols in a certain direction or in a certain area.

To reconnoiter: To seek information of the enemy or of the ground.

To make a reconnaissance: Same meaning as *to reconnoiter*, proper obedience of the order may mean not only the posting

of observers or observing parties, but the sending of patrols. This is a much-used term and is not susceptible of a close military definition.

In observation: An individual, party, or body of troops ordered *to observe*. It also has a technical field artillery definition, meaning an organization unlimbered and prepared to fire.

To mark the route: To indicate the path to be followed so that it cannot be mistaken. This may be done by posting individuals, blazing trees or even dropping articles of equipment in an emergency.

To post markers: To place individuals to mark the route.

Contact: The meaning of this expression may range from communication by any of the known methods to actual physical juxtaposition. The context of orders or instructions and the special situation determine its nature. To secure or maintain contact with hostile forces generally implies that they must be kept within sight or hearing.

To orient: (1) To adjust one's self mentally to a situation or so to inform another that he is enabled to do likewise. This term is very much used in this significance.

(a) To place a map or sketch so that its cardinal directions conform to the points of the compass.

Orientation: The dissemination of information as to the situation.

POINTS

Pivot: The point or the body of troops which does not gain or lose ground in a change of direction.

Reference point: A fixed point which is used as the origin of measurements or directions.

Exclusive; Inclusive: To occupy (reconnoiter, etc.) the line Signal Mountain—Monument Hill (both exclusive) means that only the ground *between* these points is to be occupied (reconnoitered, etc.). To occupy (reconnoiter, etc.) the line Monument Hill—Signal Mountain (both inclusive) means that not only the ground between these points is to be occupied (reconnoitered) but both Monument Hill and Signal Mountain as well. To occupy (reconnoiter, etc.) the line Monument Hill

(exclusive) Signal Mountain (inclusive) means that not only the ground between these points is to be occupied (reconnoitered, etc.) but Signal Mountain as well, while Monument Hill is *not to be*. These are much-used expressions and very important.

SECURITY

Cover: As a noun, this word expresses concealment with frequently the additional idea of protection from hostile fire, such as *cover from view*, as by a screen of bushes and trees; and *cover from fire*, as by entrenchments or by some natural feature, as a hill.

As a verb (to cover) it has two diametrically opposite military meanings. The one means *to get in rear of*, as *to cover in file*; or *move up and cover (get behind) the 1st Infantry*. The second meaning is that of protection; thus: *Move up and cover the 1st Infantry*, in which the meaning may be to move up and protect the 1st Infantry by taking up such a position as to prevent its being attacked.

In still another sense, it has the additional meaning of screening or preventing observation. Thus, *the 1st Cavalry will cover the movement* may mean that this organization will prevent hostile observation and interference with the movement.

Generally the context, special situation, or the character of the troops to whom the expression is applied determines its special meaning, but care should be exercised that its meaning is plain whenever it is used.

To take cover: Generally means to get out of observation from hostile positions or hostile parties.

Covering detachment: An organization delegated to screen another from attack or observation or both.

MAPS AND SKETCHES

Road sketch: A map of a road generally made on a scale of 8 inches to 1 mile with ground forms shown by contours at 20 feet vertical intervals. It should show not only the road features but at least 300 yards of the terrain on each side of the

road, and as much more of the terrain as its special use may require.

Place sketch: A map made by an observer who is limited to one particular point in making it.

Position sketch: A map of any locality in which the mapper is free to go over the entire area in general. In the field artillery, the term is sometimes used as the name of a map or sketch of a particular artillery position.

Outpost sketch: A map of the terrain observable from an outpost in the direction of the enemy. In general, the term is applicable to a map in which the mapper is free to move along one of the boundaries of the map but cannot penetrate far into the terrain being sketched.

Panoramic sketch: This is a sketch (not map) made from a single position of the mapper in which objectives are made of record by the radius vector method, with a few of the features of the landscape shown panoramically to assist in orientation and identification. It is used principally in the field artillery.

Such a sketch is of little or no value except at the particular point where made.

TROOPS

Leading troops: A term often applied to a particular body of troops leading the way for others, but specifically and greatly used to designate the troops leading in a retirement.

Rear troops: A term often applied to a particular body of troops at the rear of a column, but specifically and greatly used to designate the troops following a column where the detail of a regular rear guard is not necessary; a small rear guard whose principal function is that of a provost guard.

Advance cavalry: Cavalry assigned to an advance guard under the orders of an advance guard commander.

Independent cavalry: Cavalry not a part of an advance guard and operating generally at some distance from the column under the orders of the commander of the column.

The whole or a part of any cavalry pertaining to a body of mixed troops on the march may be assigned by the commander of the column to the advance guard, in which case it is known

as *advance cavalry*. Any cavalry not so assigned and operating solely under the orders of the commander of the column is *independent cavalry*. It generally has some specific mission and is independent only in the sense that it reports directly to the commander of the column.

SHELTER

Camp: Shelter under canvas.

Bivouac: No special shelter.

Cantonment: Shelter in huts or temporary buildings.

Billets: Shelter in private buildings.

SANITARY FORMATIONS

Regimental aid station: A medical station for emergency treatment of wounded, established during combat by the sanitary personnel of a regiment or separate battalion at a place fixed by the organization commander. This station is little more than a place for assembling wounded.

Dressing station: A medical station established during combat, in rear of the line of regimental aid stations, by the personnel of ambulance companies.

Station for slightly wounded: A medical station established during combat, at a place designated in division orders, by the personnel of the sanitary train for slightly wounded cases to relieve the dressing stations.

TRAINS

Combat trains: The personnel, vehicles, and animals attached to organizations for transporting the ammunition reserve and special equipment required during combat. They include the mule or cart carrying the sanitary first aid equipment.

Field trains: The personnel, vehicles, and animals attached to organizations for carrying the authorized allowance of baggage, rations, and grain.

Ammunition train: All vehicles, animals, and personnel employed in transporting the divisional artillery and infantry

ammunition reserve, or in bringing up the same from the ammunition refilling point to the combat trains of organizations.

Supply train: All vehicles, animals, and personnel employed in transporting the divisional ration and grain reserve, or in bringing up the same from the refilling point to the distributing point. To it may also be attached herds of beef cattle, remounts, vehicles carrying reserve quartermaster supplies, and reserve transportation.

Sanitary train: All vehicles, animals, personnel, and reserve sanitary material, not attached to organizations, employed in collecting and caring for the sick and wounded of the division pending their evacuation by the line of communications.

Engineer train: All vehicles, animals, and personnel for transporting heavy entrenching tools, explosives, and other engineer equipment and material which, under ordinary conditions, is required to accompany the division.

Ammunition, supply, sanitary, and engineer columns: These columns belong to the line of communications and are attached to the advance section of its supply, sanitary, and telegraph services. They are the means whereby transportation, equipment, supplies, evacuation and field hospitals, and ambulance companies, not continually required with a division, may be pushed forward when needed.

SUPPLY

Distributing point: A place where the ration sections of the field trains are replenished, either from the supply train or the line of communications; in the latter case, either directly from its depots or by means of its supply columns.

Ammunition distributing station: The place where combat trains are sent to be resupplied.

Refilling point: The place where the empty vehicles of the supply train are refilled.

Ammunition refilling point: The place where the ammunition train is refilled.

Rendezvous point: The place to which the supply columns are dispatched and where they are met by a representative of the

commander of the field forces and conducted to distributing points.

Ammunition rendezvous point: The place to which the ammunition columns are dispatched and where they are met by a representative of the commander of the field forces and conducted to the ammunition refilling point.

MOVEMENTS

To deploy: To pass from column to a line formation. In the field artillery, to go into position.

To extend: To increase the front occupied.

To take so much distance: To get behind another organization at a specified distance.

To get your distance: To take distance as prescribed by orders or the drill regulations.

To clear (a certain point): To get the tail of a column or organization past a certain point.

To follow at (a certain distance): To follow another organization with a certain specified open road space between its tail and the head of your column.

To precede (a certain organization) at (so much distance): So to direct the march of your organization that there is a specified distance between the tail of your column and the head of the designated one.

To guide on: If a moving organization or individual is specified, this term means to keep abreast of it, to follow it, to conform to its movements, according to the context of your order or the special situation.

To entrench: To dig in; to construct gun pits and other shelter.

To attack: For field artillery, to open fire.

To retreat: To move to the rear.. Do not use this expression with reference to your own troops. Use *retire*, *fall back*, *withdraw*.

To retire: To fall back or retreat.

To retire by echelon: A retirement in which the organizations fall back in succession, those organizations first retiring

usually taking up a position to cover the retirement of succeeding ones.

Flanking movement: Any movement in which an attempt is made to get on the enemy's flank.

Turning movement: A flanking movement executed over a considerable distance; a flanking movement in which the troops attempting to get on the hostile flank get out of supporting distance from troops opposed to the hostile front.

Envelopment or enveloping movement: A flanking movement in which the troops attempting to reach the hostile flank do not get beyond supporting distance of troops opposed to the hostile front.

To support: For the field artillery, to render assistance by firing upon hostile formations which are interfering with the organization to be supported.

To coöperate: To act in conjunction with another organization. This implies a thorough understanding of mutual capabilities, limitations, methods of action, mission, and orders. Uninterrupted communication between organizations attempting to coöperate is essential.

The following is an extract from the proposed Service Regulations for Field Artillery on the subject of *field orders*.

It should be noted that a part of these regulations are descriptive or are optional in their application, but that certain parts are mandatory. These regulations only amplify similar explicit directions in the Field Service Regulations and officers who disregard them do so at their own responsibility.

FIELD ORDERS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The object of field orders is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intention of the leader, suited to the occasion, by insuring the coöperation of the various elements of the command in the execution of a mission.

This involves a preliminary consideration of all the circumstances which necessitate a course of action, commonly called the *estimate of the situation*, a logical conclusion based upon such estimate, commonly called the *decision*, a *plan of action* to carry out the decision and a statement, written or oral, of the decision and plan, which statement constitutes the *order*.

Whenever possible, the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the terrain.

In service, the time available for estimation of the situation, formation of a plan, formation of the order, and its transmission to subordinates will vary greatly from hours to minutes and even to seconds. By constant practice with all manner of technical and tactical problems under varying conditions, officers must habituate themselves to a rapid process of accurate reasoning, to the quick enunciation of clear and comprehensive orders and commands and to resolute action.

COMPOSITION OF THE ORDER

A decision having been reached and a plan of action decided, the first step is a consideration of how much of the information upon which this decision and plan are based should be given out, and how much is necessary for that understanding by subordinates which insures their intelligent coöperation. In emergencies, this part of the order may have to be omitted due to the necessity for prompt action but when time permits, it should habitually be done and, when it must be omitted, the first opportunity to inform the command should be seized. If no change in the situation has occurred, it is best so to state. If there has been a material change in the situation and no orders are necessary, it is still well to communicate this information at seasonable moments and thus to keep the command constantly advised. Care must be exercised in publishing distressing or discouraging news likely to impair the morale of the command.

The second part of the order in logical sequence is the statement of the plan of the commander. As a rule this should be brief. By itself, it would ordinarily convey little definite information to a subordinate as to his own course of action. It should, however, be unmistakable and unequivocal and express fully the decision of the commander.

The third part of the order contains the disposition decided upon to carry out the decision expressed in the second part. It should therefore be the logical outgrowth of the preceding part and is, in reality, a continuation or supplement to that part. It is generally not sufficient to tell each subordinate his own part of the program only. Successful coöperation and self-reliance require that each subordinate be acquainted with the tasks assigned to the others. This part usually contains orders to the next lower tactical units only.

The fourth part of the order contains such instructions as do not strictly pertain to the preceding part and instructions to parts of the command not involved directly in the tactical or technical part of the plan, such as trains, sanitary units, etc.

The fifth part of the order gives the location of the commander or of headquarters, or the point to which messages and reports are to be sent. It also informs as to the location of *lines of information*, if any have been established.

Field orders to a command of any size logically fall into the five parts above mentioned or become what may be called the *five paragraph order*. It is a logical model to follow in both written and verbal orders as its form is such as to insure and secure consideration of all essential tactical details

both on the part of the one issuing the order and on the part of the recipients.

Every leader must follow a logical system for formulating orders, practice it until it becomes second nature and then habitually follow his accepted system. In this way only can he be reasonably certain that his orders cover all that is required.

Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command. In this way the commander assigns tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors and areas, etc., in accordance with his plan. If the terms employed convey definite ideas and leave no loopholes the conduct of subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory.

When issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly what is to be done by each subordinate, but not *how* it is to be done. He should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate, and cannot substitute another.

Although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be the expression of a fixed decision. Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or the inability to formulate orders.

Usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency a commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any subordinate. In such case, he should promptly inform the immediate commander concerned.

Combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared.

Arguments, reasons, conjectures, or any part of the mental process entering into the estimate have no place in a field order. Facts, or what are supposed to be facts, and definite instructions only, should be incorporated.

Administrative details should be covered in separate orders except when circumstances require that they be included in the field order.

Orders issued by subordinates should not be mere repetitions of those from higher authority with additions of their own. New orders are generally clearer and more satisfactory, though in giving verbal orders it is frequently desirable to read any written orders from superior authority.

The initial combat orders of the field artillery brigade are usually written. The written order is preferable and is used whenever time permits. If time permits, subsequent orders are likewise written, either as field orders or as messages.

Written orders should be so distinct as to be legible even in a bad light. Sentences should be short. Geographical names are spelled in ROMAN CAPITALS. Where the spelling does not conform to the pronunciation, the latter is shown phonetically in parentheses. When two or more places on the map have the same name they must be identified by reference to other points. A road is designated by connecting two or more names of places on the road by dashes.

The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are intended are assembled, if practicable, at a place from which the situation and plan can be explained.

Subsequent orders are verbal or in the form of verbal or written messages. Verbal messages should not be used unless they are short and unmistakable.

To get the most out of a study of this paper, the reader should not only follow the text carefully on the map, marking the location of the various units with colored pins but he should follow up situations dropped in the text by carefully writing out the orders he would give and subjecting them to criticism.

At tactical exercises in the field, particularly those without troops, such as tactical rides and walks, subordinates should be required to write out their orders in furtherance of a special situation. The results should then be discussed in conference. It is only by such labor that officers can strengthen the will and acquire self-reliance, the power of decision and the necessary command of language that constitutes the technique of the important subject of the giving of orders.

This practice need not be limited to tactical matters. Whenever a decision and orders are necessary in the routine administrative work of any officer, at stables, in the gun shed, in the orderly room, as the executive of courts and boards, he can constantly practice acquiring the habit of careful consideration, prompt decision, and the announcing of clear, concise, and unequivocal orders.

PART II—THE OFFENSIVE

General Situation:—A Blue field army of three divisions and an auxiliary division of army troops has crossed the Red River into hostile territory and is advancing on Chickasha up the east branch of the Rock Island R. R. At Waurika, Brig. Gen. A with a reënforced brigade was detached under orders to move up the west branch of the Rock Island R. R., keep abreast of the field army and open up the railroad. Gen. A's command consists of:

1st Infantry Brigade (1st, 2nd, and 3d Regiments).

1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry.

1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery (Batteries A, B, and C, light).

Company A, 1st Engineers.

Company A, 1st Field Battalion, Signal Troops.

1st Ambulance Company.

Second line troops are following this advance in charge of the line of communications.

On March 15, the field army reached the line, Denton-Bray. The same day Gen. A camped south of Lawton. Late that afternoon it was reported that two regiments of Red infantry and some artillery were in camp north of Apache Gate.

RECONNAISSANCE OF, ADVANCE TO, AND OCCUPATION OF A POSITION

Special Situation:—Gen. A marched on Richards via the West Lawton road early on March 16.

ORDER OF MARCH

1st Sq., 1st Cav., independent.

Advance Guard:

1st Inf.

Distance, 1000 yards.

Main body (in order of march):—

2d Inf. (less 2 Bns.).

1st Bn., 1st F. A. (less C. Tns.).

2 Bns., 2d Inf.
3d Inf.
Co. A, Sig.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
Arty. C. Tns.
1st Amb. Co.
Distance, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile.
Field trains.

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

The 1st Bn., 1st F. A., marched in the following order:

Bn. detail and the Btry. reconnaissance officers with their orderlies (less certain individuals).

Reel cart.

Btry. A (senior captain).

Btry. B (2d ranking captain).

Btry. C (3d ranking captain).

Lieut. A, reconnaissance officer from Btry. A and Scout corporal A and Scout private A of the battalion detail were with the advance guard.

The battalion commander, Maj. A, and the battalion adjutant, Capt. D, with their orderlies rode with Gen. A's staff at the head of the reserve of the advance guard.

At 10:00 A. M. rifle fire was heard at the front. At 10:15 artillery fire was heard from the northwest. In the meantime several messengers from the cavalry had arrived.

The information to date was that the advance guard had encountered hostile patrols shortly after entering the Fort Sill reservation; that hostile troops occupied Artillery Ridge and had fired on the leading troops with artillery.

At 10:30 A. M. shortly after the support of the advance guard had entered the reservation, the column halted. The general and his staff accompanied by Maj. A rode forward and joined the advance guard commander who was dismounted near West Gate. Hostile infantry could be seen on Artillery Ridge preparing the place for defense. The leading battalion of the advance guard regiment, partly deployed, was northwest of

1193 taking cover in the folds of the ground. The two battalions of the reserve were in column in the ditches along the West Lawton road south of West Gate. The head of the main body was opposite the Lockhart house.

In the meantime, Lieut. A reported to Capt. D:

About twenty shrapnel were fired from the direction of Artillery Ridge. They were all short and struck about half a mile N. W. of West Gate. We got two fuze heads which were set one for 4400 and one for 4600 yards. Corp. A has been up that ravine west of the Walker house and reports mounted cover from No. 4 Bluff over there to within about 400 yards of the wire fence and dismounted cover up to the fence. I haven't reconnoitered any east of this road.

At 10:35 A. M., Gen. A turned to his aide, Lieut. X and said:

I am going to attack in force; the 1st Inf. via Speedway; the 2d and 3d Inf. through Dunbar Gate. Go back to the main body, put it in march turning west at Lockhart and march on Dunbar Gate. Have the field trains halt in the south edge of Lawton, prepared to move north or south. I will start for the Stecker Cross Roads in about ten minutes; rejoin me there.

At 10:38, the general gave the following verbal order to the advance guard commander in the presence of his staff and Maj. A:

Our cavalry reports that the hostile force that camped last night near Apache Gate has moved to Artillery Ridge and is entrenching. It consists of two regiments of infantry and one battery. No cavalry. We will attack in force. Colonel: Your regiment will attack the southeast face of the ridge. Your left guiding on the iron flag pole (1271). Send patrols through the Old and New Posts.

I intend to turn the main body west at Lockhart, move to Dunbar Gate, and attack their right flank with the 2d Inf., the 3d Inf. following the 2d in reserve.

The artillery will go into position near Grierson Hill and support the attack of the 2d Inf.

Our cavalry is now near Dunbar Gate and will cover our left flank. Don't push your attack beyond the Grierson Hill—New Post road until I send you word that the 2d Inf. is ready to attack. The signal troops will establish communication from here to brigade headquarters in the vicinity of Dunbar Gate. The Surgeon will be ordered to establish a dressing station at this farmhouse (Walker). I am going shortly to the Stecker House, thence to Dunbar Gate.

At 10:45, Gen. A addressed Maj. A as follows:

You have heard my orders to Col. A. The 2d Inf. will launch its attack between Dunbar Gate and Hill 1174. That will give you all of Grierson Hill for your battalion. You may fire on those hostile working parties as soon as you are ready and support the attack of the 2d Inf. vigorously.

Maj. A turned to his adjutant and ordered:

Go back to the battalion. Have the captains and their battery details assemble at the head of the battalion.

Explain the situation to Capt. A and direct him to take the battalion out of column and move it under cover to west of the Stecker House and await orders.

Send one of the battery combat train agents to advance the entire combat train to cross-roads 24.

Then bring all our battalion detail except the reel cart and join me at the Stecker House.

Maj. A then called Lieut. A, and ordered:

We are going to attack Artillery Ridge. Our battalion is going into position on Grierson Hill which is that high ground over there where you see the skeleton tower. You and Corp. A will remain with the headquarters of the general and act as agents. Pvt. A, you will come with me.

The brigade adjutant being nearby, Maj. A went up to him and said:

This is Lieut. A of my battalion. He and his orderly and a corporal will remain with you as agents.

About this time the general and his staff mounted and rode via J. T. Rogers toward the Stecker House.

Maj. A then mounted and with his orderly and Pvt. A rode via Rogers to the Stecker House where he dismounted. He observed that the main body was in march along the Lockhart—24 road. One company of the 2d Inf. was double timing ahead of the column gaining ground apparently for advance guard duty. Some mounted men from that regiment were trotting toward 25 and a second party was coming toward him along the 23-22 road. In response to the major's inquiry, the man in charge informed him that they were under orders to reconnoiter to Grierson Hill. The major also noted his adjutant and his battalion detail trotting across field from Lockhart.

The major then got out his map and looked north. The steel tower on Grierson Hill could be seen and in the distance, Medicine Bluff No. 4 was plainly visible. He applied his scale to the map and noted that the Stecker House was probably within 3-inch gun range from Artillery Ridge and that the battalion should not cross the open ground just west of the Stecker House if it could be avoided. Through his glasses he noted the fringe of trees along the road near the Dixon house

and that the ground was much lower there. He therefore decided to route the battalion there rather than toward the Stecker House and calling up Scout Pvt. A, said to him:

Due north in extension of this road at about 3 miles, a prominent hill. That is Medicine Bluff No. 4. There is a hostile battery somewhere in that vicinity. Go across field to our battalion which you see marching over there and tell Capt. A to move toward that Dixon House down there instead of toward this house and to keep out of observation from that hill No. 4. I will have the route marked for him from Dixon House. You remain with Capt. A.

At 11:00 A. M., the adjutant and the battalion detail reported to the major and Capt. D informed him that all messages had been delivered and the agent dispatched to the combat train.

The major then called the detail to attention and said:

That hilltop you see directly north at about 3 miles is Medicine Bluff No. 4. Hostile troops are in position over there. They have one battery. This battalion is going into position on Grierson Hill a mile and a quarter due north of here. There is a skeleton steel tower on Grierson Hill. You can't miss it. That is where I can be found. The battalion is marching on the Dixon House down there. Capt. D, take the remainder of our scouts and mark a route under cover from No. 4 from the Dixon House up to Grierson Hill. The remainder of the detail follow me. I am going to Grierson Hill across fields to the northwest here.

Upon arrival at the little jog in the Dunbar Gate—22 road, it was evident to the major that the route along Wolf Creek was practically under cover from No. 4 except for about 75 yards just north of the hillock 1170 where the tip of No. 4 was visible. Although probably an excess of caution, he gave the following order to the A Battery Agent:

Go back and meet Capt. D. Show him that open spot and tell him to have the batteries cross it successively in line at a trot. Tell him also to halt the battalion at the reservation fence and report on the hill for further orders. You rejoin me at the hill.

At the reservation fence, the major ordered the B and C Battery Agents:

Dismount, turn over your horses to this orderly and cut out four panels of this fence. Wrap the wire around the posts.

The major rode up Grierson Hill, dismounted a little west of the steel tower and walked up to 1244 taking with him the B Battery Agent only. He was shortly afterward joined by

Capt. D. All other members of the battalion detail remained under cover to the rear. The battalion had halted south of the reservation fence.

From this position there was an uninterrupted view of Artillery Ridge. Hostile infantry could be seen along the southeast face and for several hundred yards along the southwest face digging themselves in. The battery was not visible, nor was anything visible on the Medicine Bluffs. Blue cavalry patrols were observed to the northwest around 1216; the cavalry squadron had just mounted and was moving up Wolf Creek. There were some infantry mounted officers near Dunbar Gate, also Blue infantry scouts on Evans Knob and rifle firing could be heard in the New Post, evidently between patrols. West of the Dunbar Gate—16 road the hill slope was too much exposed for any battery position. East of this road a draw ran up toward the saddle between the steel tower and 1244 forming a large basin entirely defiladed from No. 4 Bluff and Artillery Ridge; a second large draw ran up the hill south of the steel tower, also completely defiladed from the hostile positions.

Without delaying further, the major ordered:

B Battery Agent—Go back at a gallop and tell all the battery commanders to report here on reconnaissance.

Capt. D, bring up some scouts and assign one to observation of the Medicine Bluffs, one to Artillery Ridge and one for general observation of the front; also have a man watch Dunbar Gate and let me know when the infantry column appears.

When the three captains reported, the major directed them crawl up alongside him on the crest and after allowing them time to get their breath and focus their field glasses informed them as follows:

The ridge over there to the north where you see the hostile working parties is Artillery Ridge. The Bluffs extending to the east are Medicine Bluffs, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 counting from the right. The buildings to our right front are the New Post of Fort Sill. The road along our front is Speedway. This is Grierson Hill and to our left rear is Dunbar Gate.

The hostile force reported at Apache Gate last night has gone into position at Artillery Ridge. The troops you see to the east are the 1st Infantry. The hostile battery has been firing on the 1st Infantry and has stopped their advance. The general has ordered an attack on Artillery Ridge. The 1st Infantry is to advance along Speedway. The 2d Inf., followed by the 3d Inf. in reserve, advances through Dunbar Gate attacking the hostile right

flank. Our battalion is ordered into position on this hill to support the attack of the 2d Inf.

The cavalry squadron is moving northwest from Dunbar Gate to cover our left flank.

A Battery will go into position down there (pointing to the southwest a little north of the 1190 contour) and as soon as all batteries are in position will open fire on those working parties on Artillery Ridge.

B Battery will go into position directly south of here on the right of A Battery and attack the hostile battery just as soon as it can be located. Take those Bluffs under observation for hostile observing parties. Capt. B, you can open fire for adjustment on No. 4 Bluff.

C Battery will unlimber in the draw south of the steel tower and be prepared to support B Battery in its attack on the hostile artillery.

All batteries will take flank defilade against the Medicine Bluffs.

All battery limbers to the clump of trees just southwest of the jog in the Dunbar Gate—22 road.

We will have to observe from this hill, so keep all the battery stations east of this road and opened out along the crest here in order from left to right, A, B, and C, to keep out of the lines of fire.

The combat trains are ordered to Crossroads 24, one half mile south of Stecker. First aid station back there at the reservation fence where we cut the wire.

I am going now to the 2d Inf. over there near Dunbar Gate and will take station with Capt. B upon my return. Capt. A, take command in my absence.

To the Adjutant:

Have the reel cart halt near the jog in the Dunbar Gate—22 Road and await orders. All led horses of headquarters to the same place. Tell the surgeon to establish his first aid station at the reservation fence where we cut the wire.

The major returned to the horses and with Lieut. B, Scout Corp. C and Pvt. B rode to Dunbar Gate where he met Col. B of the 2d Inf. and Gen. A. He informed Col. B that his batteries would be in position in about ten minutes and pointed out to him their general location. From the colonel he learned that the 1st Bn. was to advance, march direction, Tower No. 1; the 2d Bn. up the pipe line until opposite 1216 where it was to change direction half right and advance abreast of the 1st Bn. The 3d Bn. was to follow the 1st in reserve. The brigade adjutant informed Maj. A that a dressing station had been set up along the creek at hill 1170.

Maj. A then oriented Lieut. B and ordered:

You and Corp. C and Pvt. B will go with the headquarters of the 2d Inf. as agents. It is very important that we locate that hostile battery. Send

me any information you can get as to its definite location. Watch for its flashes and if it fires at you get the direction of the furrows and look for fuze heads with the time settings.

The major then said to the Adjutant of the 2d Inf.:

This is Lieut. B of my battalion. He and these two men will go with you as agents for any messages to me.

Maj. A then returned to Grierson Hill and took station with Capt. B just below the crest about 400 yards east of 1244. As he passed Lieut. B, the battalion surgeon, who had taken post with his pack mule at the break in the reservation fence, he informed him:

The ambulance company is to set up a dressing station back there at the hillock by the creek.

All the batteries were in position by this time. A Battery had opened fire on the working parties. B Battery was registering by fire on Medicine Bluff No. 4. C Battery was awaiting orders.

The adjutant stated that the combat train agent had just reported that the train was halted in the field south of the Stecker farmhouse and that the battery combat train agents had not yet joined their batteries.

The major called Lieut. G, the group agent, and said:

Go back with all the battery combat train agents and tell the combat train commander to move the train up toward the Dixon Farm, follow the trail of the battalion up to where the limbers now are and post it in the big draw east of the limbers. Put a signal party out to the north to watch the steel tower for signals from us. You see that hill over there (No. 4 Bluff)? Keep the train defiladed from there. Guide the train to its position. Then send the battery agents to their executives. Then report to me here.

To the adjutant:

The men of headquarters who are observing Artillery Ridge and Medicine Bluffs can be relieved. Assign two men to watch the advance of the 2d Inf., and be prepared to tell just where its advance lines are at any time and two other men to watch the 1st Inf. similarly.

THE DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS IN BATTERY A

As soon as the major had finished giving his orders for the occupation of position, Capt. A signaled for his instrument sergeant, range finder and Scout No. 2, and upon their arrival, said:

To the north, at about 3000 yards, in the direction of the wooded hills, you can see the enemy working on his position. We attack, the 1st Inf. moving along that road to our right, the 2d Inf. up the ravine to our left. Our battalion takes position here.

Sector: the whole of the hill on which the enemy is working. He has a battery which will be watched for.

My reference point is the iron flag pole on the left edge of the hill.

First target: the troops near the flag pole.

Set up my station about 20 yards to our right (indicating a point a little south of the letter G in Grierson).

The guns will be four or five hundred yards to our left rear. I am going to mark their position.

Aiming point,—the blockhouse on Signal Mountain (pointing).

Telephone communication.

Capt. A then ran back to the horses, mounted and, followed by the remainder of his detail, proceeded to reconnoiter the gun position. Having selected the exact position he called: *Gun markers*, and said to the telephone corporal:

Led horses near the steel tower. Telephone communication.

Capt. A then posted the gun markers (Operator No. 1 and Scout No. 1) and informed them as to the aiming point and the direction of fire.

He then ordered the 1st sergeant:

The battery will move up at a walk. Form double section, trot. After crossing the fence, enter the position from the right, action right. Aiming point—the blockhouse on Signal Mountain. Limbers to that clump of trees south of the fence.

The captain then returned to the vicinity of his station, dismounted and turned his horse over to his orderly who proceeded to and took charge of the led horses near the steel tower.

As soon as he received his orders, the 1st sergeant proceeded at a collected gallop to the battery which was just south of the fence, saluted and reported to the executive as follows:

Sir, the captain directs that you unlimber where he has posted the gun markers (pointing.) The battery will move up at a walk. Form double section, trot. After crossing this fence, enter the position from the east, action right. Aiming point, the blockhouse on Signal Mountain (pointing).

As soon as he crossed the fence the executive formed double section, changed direction, entered the position and unlimbered as indicated in his orders.

The 1st sergeant at once took charge of the limbers and without further orders moved them off at a walk. Having reached

the clump of trees, he formed them under cover in line with full intervals, facing north, and posted two men (caisson corporals) to watch the front and especially for signals from the executive.

As soon as the pieces were unlimbered the executive commanded:

Aiming point: The blockhouse on Signal Mountain, that high hill due west of here (pointing).

Approximate deflection: 5000.

Lieut. K (assistant to the executive), see that the gunners and chiefs of section identify the aiming point.

When communication was established, the executive reported to the captain:

Battery ready to fire.

The executive then started all available men entrenching the position, first digging trenches for the trail spades, and having been directed by the captain to provide men to construct cover at the B. C. station, he sent the No. 7's with the proper tools to that station.

Observing that there were no line guards out, the executive ordered two fifth section cannoneers:

Privates P and Q.—Get out on the telephone line and watch it. P, go out about 100 yards and Q, go one half way up the hill toward the captain. Also do not let anybody cross the front of the battery.

He also directed Pvt. R, a cannoneer of the fifth section caisson on the left flank of the battery, to watch to the left and prevent anyone crossing the front of the line of guns.

The executive then assured himself, by using his field glasses, that the limbers were where they were ordered to go and stationed himself near the telephone awaiting orders.

Upon returning to his station, Capt. A inspected the data already secured and directed that such supplementary data be secured as seemed necessary. Upon receipt of reports that communication with the battery was established and that the latter was ready to fire and having observed that the other batteries were in position he decided to open fire on that part of the enemy's force which was working near the point 1271.

The captain commanded:

1. Battery attention.
2. Deflection 5280.

3. On 2d Piece, Open 10.
4. Site, 310.
5. Corrector, 30.
6. Battery right.
7. 3100.

His observations were:

- 1st shot,—graze, short—10 mils to right of pole.
- 2nd shot,—graze, short— 5 mils to left of pole.
- 3rd shot,—graze, doubt—25 mils to left of pole.
- 4th shot,—graze, doubt—35 mils to left of pole.

The captain commanded:

1. On 2d Piece, Close 10.
2. Up 5.
3. 3300.

His observations were:

- 1st shot,—lost.
- 2nd shot,—lost.
- 3rd shot,—low, doubt.
- 4th shot,—normal, doubt.

The captain decided that the lost shots fell in the depression shown by his map just north of the flag pole and that those shots were therefore *over*; he further decided that, under the conditions of the ground, effect from the 3rd and 4th shots would have been visible had the trajectories of those rounds been short. He therefore concluded that 3300 was over and, as he noticed that portion of the enemy at which he was firing had taken cover in the trench, decided to reduce his bracket.

The captain commanded:

1. 3200.

He observed:

- 1st shot,—low, short.
- 2nd shot,—normal, effect short, and over.
- 3rd shot,—graze, short.
- 4th shot,—low, over.
- Distribution,—good.

The captain commanded:

1. Up 2.
2. Battery, 2 rounds.
3. 3200.

Upon the completion of the two rounds, Capt. A observed that the fire was effective and commanded:

1. Left 20.
2. 3200.

Observing that the first volley appeared to be over he commanded:

1. 3100.

By similar commands, Capt. A shifted his sheaf and swept the whole of the southwest face of Artillery Ridge as far to the left as he could observe working parties; then shifted to the southeast slope and did likewise. This caused practically all the hostile troops exposed on Artillery Ridge to take cover and the major directed Battery A to cease firing and to report the data found by fire on the position near the flag pole.

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

The major transmitted these data to Capt. C and ordered him to register on the flag pole.

In the meantime the hostile battery became active, firing on the leading elements of the 2d Inf. near hill 1216. All batteries were directed to observe closely for any evidences of its location. Also the major directed the adjutant to take two men and the reel cart to lay line to 1216 or further west and to get information as to the location of the hostile battery. The adjutant took Scout Pvt. A and the telephone private with him.

Firing intermittently, the hostile battery continued to impede the advance of both the 1st and 2d Inf. until, at 1:30 P. M., a message was received from the adjutant to the effect that the battery was located 600 yards due north of the iron flag pole on Artillery Ridge and that there were hostile observing parties on the northeast slope of Rumbough Hill near the crest.

Pointing out the location of the hostile battery on Capt. B's map, the major said to him:

Search an area around this point about 200 yards square.

He then gave the following information and orders to A and C Batteries.

Hostile battery located 600 yards north of iron flag pole on Artillery Ridge. Hostile observing parties on northeast slope of Rumbough Hill near the crest. Battery B will attack the hostile battery. Battery A will attack the observing parties on Rumbough Hill.

DISPOSITION AND ORDERS IN THE CONSOLIDATED COMBAT TRAIN

The consolidated combat train of the battalion under command of 2d Lieut. L of Battery A was marching in the order of A, B, and C Batteries behind Company A, 1st Engineers. The combat train agent sent by the battalion adjutant arrived at the train and delivered the following verbal message to 2d Lieut. L when the head of the train was about one half mile south of 31:

The battalion is going into position on Grierson Hill. It turned west at the cemetery about one mile ahead on this road. The train is to advance to crossroads 34.

Lieut. L identified Grierson Hill and cross roads 24 on his map and noted that he could get there either by continuing in the column or by the cross streets through Lawton Heights. He chose to do the latter and turned the head of his train to the west at the next east and west street. At the same time he called up Caisson Corporals A and B and said to them:

I am moving the train to cross roads 24 (showing them his present location and the crossroads on his map). The place I want to reach, you will note, is just one mile north and one mile west. Scout ahead and mark the route through these cross streets and across lots to that place, 24.

He was able to trot some and upon arrival at 24 found the crossing blocked by halted infantry and the road running to the northwest toward 25 also full of infantry. The road from 24 north was clear. He also saw the tail of the artillery battalion moving west of the Dixon House and requested permission of an infantry field officer at the crossroads to let his train pass. This was granted and he moved north past 24 until the tail of his column was clear of the crossroads. After that he moved the three battery trains by heads of columns to the west until clear of the road, executed by the right flank, halted and dismounted his drivers. He then dispatched Caisson Corps. A and B to the Stecker crossroads to take post in observation, posted Corp. C near the head of his parked column to watch Corps. A and B and called up 2d Lieut. M, of the B Battery train, who was second in command and Sergt. C of C Battery train and said.

We are now at cross roads 24 where the battalion commander has ordered us. The battalion is going into position on Grierson Hill about one and

one-half miles due north, you can see the tail of the last battery over there to the northwest now. I have sent Caisson Corps. A and B to the crossroads up there at the Stecker House to remain in observation. Caisson Corp. C is ordered to take post here in front of the A Battery train and observe Corps. A and B for signals. I am going to send the agent to report our position to the major and am going myself to the high ground just north of the fence corner (35) from where I think I can see the battalion position. Lieut. M, you will take command of the train in my absence. Watch me for signals.

Lieut. L then called the agent and Caisson Corps. D and F to follow him and rode across fields to fence corner 35. By the time he arrived there he observed that the firing batteries were moving ahead, apparently to go into position. He ordered the agent:

Go to battalion headquarters and report that the combat trains are parked in the field north of crossroads 24. I am going to take post on the high ground up there just to the north.

From his position just north of 35, Lieut. L could see the firing batteries in position and could also observe his train. After some study with his glasses he identified the different firing batteries, the major's position and the general's headquarters near Dunbar gate. He also noted the big depression or draw immediately in front of him and came to the conclusion that it would be an excellent place for his train. He had about come to a decision to send a message to the major recommending that the train be moved there when Lieut. G, the group agent, also the battery agents arrived with the major's order to go into this identical place, saying:

You see the trail made by the battalion over there between the Dixon House and the creek and around that little hill (1170) and then up to where the limbers are? The major wants the train to follow the trail of the battalion up to the rear of the limbers and to be posted in this hollow right here to our front. I am to act as guide. When the train is in position a party is to be posted to the north to observe the steel tower for signals. Then I am to send the battery combat train agents (chief mechanics) to their executives and report in person to the major. That hill to the north is Medicine Bluff No. 4. The train is to be kept defiladed from there.

Lieut. L replied to Lieut. G:

The train is right there (pointing). Please go there and carry out the major's instructions. Tell Lieut. M to call in Corps. A and B. I will remain here for the present.

Lieut. L remained in observation until the head of the train approached hillock 1170, when he rode down into the draw, examined it, and joined the train as it came out from behind the hillock. During this reconnaissance he had observed that a part of the route from 1170 into the draw was not defiladed from No. 4. He therefore had each battery combat train cross the danger space in line at a trot, and then parked them in column of battery trains facing north. He then ordered the group and battery combat train agents to rejoin the battalion and Lieut. M and five caisson corporals to come dismounted up on the nose to the north. There he pointed out the various landmarks and the positions of the elements of the battalion and ordered:

Corps. A and B, go out several hundred yards on the high ground east of the train and remain in observation.

Corps. C and D, remain here observing the battalion and our front.

Watch the battalion particularly for signals. If any are sent it will be from around the steel tower.

Corp. E, you note where Corps. A and B go, out there to the east and watch them for signals.

Lieut. M, go over to the limbers, inspect the animals and the limbers of all the batteries, report back here.

Sergt. C, go back to the train and take immediate charge there.

I will remain here.

Lieut. M, upon his return, reported two lame draft horses in Battery A, several animals with loose shoes in Battery B, and a damaged wheel on one of the C Battery gun limbers.

Lieut. L immediately ordered him to take two draft animals from the Battery A combat train and substitute them for the lame animals on the firing battery limbers, to have the B Battery horseshoer attend to the loose shoes in that battery, and to substitute a C Battery combat train limber for the one with the damaged wheel in C Battery's firing battery. When the damaged limber was brought up to the combat train, he ordered the damaged wheel replaced by a spare wheel.

At various times during the combat he sent ammunition and other supplies forward as called for and once when the battalion was vigorously engaged he sent two caissons forward to Battery B without waiting for orders, having observed that the battery had been firing very rapidly for some time.

About 2:30 P. M. he received the following message:

From 1st Bn., 1st F. A., Grierson Hill

16 Mar. '16—2:15 P. M., No. 1.

To Lieut. L, Arty. C. Tn.

Four wagons with artillery ammunition have been sent up to the CEMETERY on WEST LAWTON ROAD. Refill empty caissons.

A,

Major.

Lieut. L* called Lieut. M, read the note to him and said:

Take the empty caissons from our train back at a trot, refill and rejoin. Be sure the limbers of the caisson sections you take back are also empty. Any ammunition you may find in the limbers going back, leave here.

A PURSUIT

DISPOSITION AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Special Situation: At 2:30 P. M. the situation, as observed by Maj. A, was as follows:

The 1st Inf., with at least two battalions in its firing line, had reached Battery Hill, its left at 20. One battalion, still in regimental reserve was in the creek bottom southwest of 21.

The 2d Inf. had advanced to Crossroads, its right being about 400 yards east of there. It also had about two battalions in the firing line. Its third battalion was just southwest of Range Tower No. 1.

The 8d Inf. was as the foot of hill 1216.

Brigade headquarters was at 1216 with wire connections to Dunbar Gate.

Capt. D, who was still out with his telephone station established near Tower No. 3, had reported that the cavalry was near Concrete Ford; that Medicine Creek was in flood and the only known practicable crossing was at Concrete Ford. This was held by a detachment of the enemy with a machine gun and the cavalry had failed in several attempts to rush it. The 1st Bn., 1st F. A., was still in position on Grierson Hill. There had

*Lieut. L had had no previous intimation that an ammunition train had been placed at the disposal of the detachment. Had he known this it would have been his duty to get in touch with that train.

been no fire from the hostile battery for the last half hour and the hostile infantry fire had considerably abated. Maj. A surmised that the hostile force had a bridge over the creek in rear of Artillery Ridge and was withdrawing, and at 2:15 P. M. he had ordered Capt. A to get his battery ready to move forward. The battery with chests full was now ready, except for taking march order, and Capt. A was with the major. Battery B was in observation of the part of artillery ridge west of the flag pole and Battery C of the part to the east. All remaining ammunition had been transferred from the combat trains to the firing battery chests. At 2:30 both of the attacking infantry regiments commenced a rapid advance and Batteries B and C opened a rapid volley fire, sweeping their respective portions of the ridge.

The signal corporal of the battalion headquarters detail suddenly called attention to a blue infantry patrol on Medicine Bluff No. 1, which was semaphoring a message to 1st Inf. headquarters. This message was:

Hostile infantry and a battery moving northeast from Mission Hill.

The major immediately sent word to Batteries B and C.

The hostile troops are evidently withdrawing northeast. Keep up the fire but be ready to move at once.

The major was about to order Battery A forward to Battery Hill when the following telephone message, taken down in writing at the Dunbar Gate station was handed him:

From Brig. Hdqrs.

To Maj. A.

Send a battery to report to Maj. B, 1st Cav., at tower No. 3 at once.

B. A.,

Brig. Adjt.

The major read the message to Capt. A and said:

Go with your battery at once.

To Lieut. C (Reconnaissance officer from Battery C):

Call up the horses.

To his sergeant major:

Telephone this to Capt. D. Enemy is retreating. Reel in rapidly. Move to Battery Hill, about 800 yards west of New Post, the major will be at Battery Hill.

To Lieut. C:

The hostile troops are retreating northeast on the far side of the creek. Batteries B and C will move to Battery Hill. Take the sergeant major and all the detail now here, except my orderlies and the agents, and gallop to Bluff No. 2. Get quick firing data for any targets, particularly the hostile column. Establish semaphore communication with a battery signaler whom I will post at Battery Hill. Don't wait for any one but open fire the minute any of the guns are ready at Battery Hill if there is any target. Send a patrol east of the bluffs to look for crossings over the creek.

To Capt. B:

Cease firing, limber, and move at a trot to Battery Hill where you will unlimber prepared to fire on targets to the northeast across the creek. Lieut. C has gone ahead to Bluff No. 2. Lay your buzzer wire from Battery Hill to Bluff No. 2. While awaiting it establish semaphore communication with Lieut. C, who will conduct the fire if necessary.

The major then went to the C Battery station and took post with Capt. C. In a few minutes it appeared that resistance had ceased entirely at Artillery Ridge and he ordered Capt. C:

Cease firing, limber, and move to Battery Hill. Halt there in readiness. I am going via Battery Hill to Bluff No. 2. The combat trains will go to 21, New Post.

To Combat Train Agent (Lieut. G):

Tell the combat train commander that the enemy is retreating. Battery A has gone to Tower No. 3. Batteries B and C are moving to Battery Hill. He will move his train to 21, New Post. Tell him to notify Battery A where he is going.

The major then called up the agents:**To A Battery Agent:**

Go to Dunbar Gate and phone headquarters that I have sent one battery to join the cavalry and have moved the other two batteries to Battery Hill to fire on the retreating enemy. If you can't get headquarters over that line any more, ride toward Tower No. 1 over there and report in person. Rejoin at Bluff No. 2.

To B Battery Agent:

Remain here and guide Capt. D, who is reeling in the line, to Battery Hill which is that low hill with a marker on it, in line with and about a thousand yards this side of the gap between Bluffs No. 2 and No. 3.

The major mounted and, accompanied by his musician, his orderly, and the C Battery Agent started via Battery Hill for Bluff No. 2. On the way he noted that the 1st and 2d Inf. regiments were reforming and that the 3d Inf. was marching toward the New Post with two companies preceding its advance.

He also noted that Lieut. C had reached Medicine Bluff No. 2 and that Battery B was unlimbering south of Battery Hill. It opened fire almost immediately. As he passed Battery Hill, Corp. A, who had been with Brigade headquarters rode out and handed the major the following message:

To Maj. A.

The general directs that you report with your remaining batteries to 3rd Inf., now ordered in pursuit via White Wolf Ford. Hdqrs. Hill 1216.

B. A.

Brig. Adjt.

The major immediately galloped toward the 3d Inf. now nearing the New Post. He found the colonel riding at the head of the main body of the regiment and reported to him. During the conversation that ensued, Maj. A explained the position of his two batteries, B and C, and suggested that they remain in that position supporting the advance of the regiment until it had gained the high ground north of the creek. The colonel accepted the suggestion and Maj. A directed his musician orderly who, with his personal orderly and C Battery Agent, were the only men with him.

Stay with the headquarters of this regiment as agent. Bring messages to me at Bluff No. 2.

He then returned to Battery Hill and ordered Capt. C:

We are ordered in pursuit with the 3d Inf. which is moving through the New Post and across White Wolf Ford. Both batteries will remain here for the present but send a reconnaissance party from your battery with the 3d Inf., to select a battery position north of the creek. Your battery will remain here in readiness. I am going to Bluff No. 2. Lieut. L's train is ordered up to 21. If he has any ammunition, fill up your chests and also tell him to fill up the B Battery chests.

As he started for the Bluff, Maj. A noticed that the reel cart was approaching Battery Hill.

DISPOSITION AND ORDERS IN BATTERY A

When Capt. A received his order to join the cavalry squadron at Range Tower No. 3, his battery detail had brought up their horses and all instruments had been packed except that the telephone line had not been taken up.

Capt. A at once ordered:

Limber up. Close station. Telephone corporal and Operator No. 2,—reel in and then rejoin the detail. The rest of you come with me.

He then mounted and rode at a fast trot toward his battery, giving his instrument sergeant the following order on the way:

There is a hostile detachment with a machine gun at Concrete Ford. Our cavalry has been unable to force a crossing; the creek is in flood and there is no other practicable crossing near there. The hostile troops are probably withdrawing from Artillery Ridge north over the creek.

We are ordered to join the cavalry at Tower No. 3. Take the battery detail and gallop ahead to that tower, marking the route. Go straight west toward Wolf Creek, thence northwest up the ravine on the other side of that ridge (1209-1212). I will follow at a trot with the battery.

As he passed the battery, the instrument sergeant picked up Operator No. 1 and Scout No. 1, whose horses he had brought along, and as they galloped west he shouted to them:

The battery is ordered to join the cavalry squadron at Range Tower No. 3, that concrete tower over there. We mark the route, west to Wolf Creek, thence northwest. The battery follows at a trot.

At 1209, the instrument sergeant slacked the pace to a walk until he saw that the ravine leading northwest was practicable when he called out:

Scout corporal A,—Halt here and lead the battery around the south slope of this hill, then follow us northwest up the ravine. That is Tower No. 3 you see over there (pointing).

The instrument sergeant then resumed the gallop. When his party arrived at the tower he saw one troop disappearing north over Concrete Ford, the remainder of the squadron moving at a fast trot toward the ford and several hundred yards from it. No enemy was in sight. The head of the battery was seen rounding 1209.

The instrument sergeant considered a moment, then ordered:

Scout corporal B. Remain here. Tell the captain the cavalry squadron is moving rapidly over the ford. I am going on to keep contact with it. Rejoin me quickly.

After crossing the ford, he saw the tail of the squadron disappearing around the north end of Indian Hill and the telephone corporal who had rejoined was left to indicate the direction to the battery. The sergeant rode to the top of Indian Hill and halted. From there he could see the main body of the cavalry crossing the two branches of Squaw Creek just west

of 11, at a slow trot, from which he assumed that the crossing was practicable for the battery. The advance guard troop was ascending Adams Ridge at a walk and the signal, *enemy in sight* was being made by patrols who were disappearing over the sky line. The range finder now called the instrument sergeant's attention to the captain galloping north from the ford followed by his orderly and Scout Corps. M and N, and the sergeant directed the range finder to head the captain off and request him to come to Indian Hill.

As soon as the situation was pointed out to the captain he said:

Examine these crossings over Squaw Creek and follow the cavalry main body. I will join you as soon as I get the battery over Squaw Creek. Take these two scouts.

The instrument sergeant galloped on to the crossings west of 11, found that they were practicable, and continued to Adams Ridge. The main body of the cavalry had by this time turned northeast at 10, still moving at a trot. The advance guard troop had formed front into line and drawn sabers. Hostile infantry was visible on Hills 1250 and 1214, and there was a column of hostile infantry along the Apache Gate—9 road.

The captain joined the instrument sergeant and said:

I'll execute left front into line and go into action here on the crest, direct laying. Target, the column on the Apache Gate road. Get me the range off your map quickly.

He then turned and rode rapidly toward the battery, which was in double section column, a short distance down the slope and commanded:

Left front into line, gallop, March.

Action front.

Limbers back down the road 200 yards.

Target, the infantry column to our front.

Deflection, zero.

Corrector, 30.

Battery right.

1700.

In the meantime the advance guard troop and the main body of the cavalry squadron had charged the infantry column but were struck in flank by severe rifle and artillery fire from north

of the Ketch road and driven back in confusion. Just as the battery was about to fire its first salvo, the hostile battery north of Ketch road turned its fire on the exposed firing battery. There were many casualties and great confusion. Some of the personnel ran to shelter down the south slope of 1244 and others huddled behind the shields. It was impossible to work the guns or withdraw and the battery was held immobilized by intermittent hostile fire.

CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

In the meantime, Lieut. C (Reconnaissance Officer from Battery C) had reached Bluff No. 2 and observed the hostile column on the Apache Gate—9 road. He was able to open fire on it a few minutes after the cavalry charge had been repulsed. The losses of the column were severe and it speedily broke and disappeared in the rough ground of the W. Jones farm and in the west branch of Cache Creek. About this time Capt. B arrived at the Bluff and Lieut. C turned the conduct of fire over to him. All of the unemployed personnel were assigned to search the ground north of Apache Gate with their glasses for the hostile battery which was punishing Battery A.

Just as the major arrived, one of the observers reported that he had located its flashes in the draw next west of the Apache Gate—Carter road and a little north of the Ketch road.

The major said to Capt. B:

Attack that battery vigorously.

To Lieut. C he said:

Keep the 3d Inf., Battery A, and the cavalry under observation, also watch to the northeast. Use the battalion detail for this work.

The major then considered:

He could expect nothing from Battery A for the present as it was probably very badly cut up, its material damaged and some of its horses lost, so he dismissed that battery from his present calculations.

He was under the orders of the colonel of the 3d Inf. and the colonel expected him to support the advance of the regiment, which was now crossing White Wolf Ford, its advance guard

double timing up the slopes of 1219. If Battery B could keep the hostile battery immobilized it would support any advance toward Apache Gate to the best purpose. Battery C was standing in readiness at Battery Hill. Little would be gained by unlimbering it there. The hostile formations were almost out of range from Battery Hill now. By having it unlimber, say just south of White Wolf Ford, he would gain a little in range, perhaps a thousand yards, and its fire could be conducted from Bluff No. 2. If the battery went on across the ford, fire control, except by semaphore from Bluff No. 2 would be out of the question as it would take too long to establish wire communication over the flooded creek. If it crossed at all, it had better not go in closer than 1219.6 or 1250 which it was evident would soon be occupied by the 3d Inf. Its advance across the creek would probably stimulate the 3d Inf. On the other hand, if it crossed Medicine Creek it would practically pass out of his, the major's, hands unless he accompanied it, and in that case he would lose immediate direction of Battery B. The major also judged he had better stay at Bluff No. 2 for the present. His field of view was larger there and there was the question of a distribution of the ammunition which he was expecting any minute from the wagons sent up to the Lawton Cemetery.

He therefore decided:

- (a) To remain in person at Bluff No. 2 for the present.
- (b) To send Battery C forward to join the 3d Inf.

By this time the B Battery wire was laid and he interrupted the battery communication over it long enough to send the following phone message to Capt. C:

Move your battery via White Wolf Ford and report in person to C. O., 3d Inf., for duty. That regiment is now crossing at the ford.

To the C Battery agent he said:

Your battery is ordered to join the 3d Inf. over there across the creek. Join your captain. Tell him where the 3d Inf. now is. Also that Battery A is out of action for the present. Tell him I am expecting more ammunition every minute and will forward some to him. I am going to remain here. You rejoin me here.

CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN BATTERY A

Battery B shortly silenced the hostile battery and the personnel of Battery A commenced to take stock of themselves. All of the battery officers, two chiefs of section and a number of privates had been killed or disabled. During the fusilade the limbers had taken refuge in the draw southeast of 10 and with the exception of two drivers and four or five horses were undamaged. The carriages of the firing battery had suffered no serious damage.

As soon as he learned that he was in command, the first sergeant, who had been with the limbers, ran up to the firing battery and commanded:

All the cannoneers on the pieces. Pieces backward, march. Chiefs of section and gunners get your pieces well down behind the hill—about 100 yards. Now run the caissons down. Everybody back up the hill to the caissons. Shut the caisson doors. Caissons backward, march. Halt.

All the 5th section cannoners go up on the hill and carry the wounded away from the front of the battery. Carry them off to our right flank. Never mind the dead.

Sergt. A. Mount up and ride to the cavalry over there, find an officer and ask for orders. Tell them we will be ready to move in 10 minutes. Ask them to send a surgeon.

Sergt. B. Get up there on the crest with a couple of men and watch the front.

Sergt. C. Look over the gun detachments and equalize the cannoneers. We'll have to abandon the 5th section.

The 1st sergeant then ran back to the limbers. The dead and wounded animals of the gun section teams he replaced from the 5th section as most of the led horses had broken away and were at large grazing in the vicinity. The 5th section limbers he ordered abandoned.

He then ordered:

Caisson Corporals A and B—Mount and catch up those loose horses. Bring them back here to the limbers. If any run away don't chase them far. Let them go.

He then proceeded to reorganize the battery detail; gave orders to Pvts. A and B of the 5th section to stay with the wounded; examined the captain's body, taking possession of all notes, orders, and memoranda; and joined Sergt. B in observation awaiting orders from the cavalry commander.

Corp. S arrived from the combat train at this time and the 1st sergeant ordered him to go back to the train and report the condition of Battery A and ask the train commander to send via Concrete Ford for the 5th section caissons which were being abandoned.

THE HANDLING OF A CAPTURED BATTERY

At 4:30 P. M. the Blue troops were located as follows:

3d Inf., leading elements, Apache Gate; 1st and 2d Inf. and Battery C, south of 1219.6 and 1250; Battery B at Battery Hill holding the hostile battery immobilized in its position north of the Ketch road; Capt. B was at Bluff No. 2; the cavalry (less Troop A) and Battery A were at 1244; Troop A had worked around to the west and was at hillock 1215 north of the Ketch road; brigade headquarters was at 1250. Maj. A and 1st Bn. Hdqrs. were also at 1250. Lieut. A, who had been with brigade Hdqrs., had been sent to command Battery A.

Most of the hostile infantry had gotten away to the north and, as it appeared to have been reinforced with infantry and another battery, the general had ordered the pursuit stopped for the day.

Semaphore signals from Troop A at 1215 announced that the hostile battery had surrendered and the troop was asking for the Blue artillery fire to cease. This was relayed by semaphore from 1250 to Bluff No. 2 and Capt. B replied "OK." As soon as this signal was received at 1215 and the Blue artillery fire on the hostile battery had ceased the captain of Troop A ordered 1st Lieut. T of his troop:

Go forward with your platoon mounted and take over that battery. March it south, turn it over to the infantry, and rejoin me. I will remain here with the rest of the troop covering you.

Lieut. T had his platoon come to *raise pistol* and trotted it in column of *twos* up to the battery where he formed line and halted facing the right flank of the battery and about 20 yards distant.

He then called out: *Officers come forward.*

One second lieutenant presented himself, stating that he was the only officer left.

In reply to Lieut. T's questions, he said that his limbers were directly south of the battery in the ravine. He did not know where the battery combat train was. It had gone north some time ago.

Lieut. T gave orders as follows:

To the Red Lieutenant:

You come over there and stand in front of my men.

To some Red cannoneers:

You three men at that caisson take off that paulin and spread it out here on the ground. Move lively. Now all you cannoneers of the first section come up here and put your pistols on that paulin. Throw your ammunition in also. Second section cannoneers come up here and do likewise. Have the rest of the prisoners deposit their pistols here.

To Sergt. S of his detachment:

Have the rest of the prisoners deposit their pistols here.

Lieut. T then dismounted and searched the Red lieutenant, taking all his papers, notebook and pistol.

He then ordered:

Each gunner remove the firing lock case from his breechblock and put it here in the paulin. You gunners now fold up that paulin and strap it on the footboard of that caisson.

To Sergt. S of his detachment:

Take ten of our men, go up to the ravine there and bring up the limbers. Don't let the Red drivers mount. Have them lead their pairs.

To the Red gunners:

Put your carriages in march order. Lock all your ammunition chests and turn the keys over to this corporal of mine. Take the ammunition out of the emergency tubes and lay it on the ground.

The limbers having arrived, the hostile drivers were required to deposit their pistols in a paulin, one section at a time and return to their horses. The paulin was bundled and secured to the footboard of a caisson.

Lieut. T then ordered:

You cannoneers of the first piece, bring all those wounded men able to ride over here and put them on the carriages. Leave that man with the sprained arm to look after those we can't transport.

To his own detachment:

We march now straight south to our own infantry which is about a half mile away.

Corp. A: You take Pvts. A and B and precede us about 200 yards. Send one man ahead to warn the infantry.

Pvt. B: You take charge of this officer and these noncommissioned officers and follow Corp. A at 200 yards.

Sergt. S: You and those next four privates take charge of the carriages and follow Pvt. B's detachment at 50 yards distance.

The Red drivers will march dismounted and lead their pairs.

Corp. B: You and the next two men take charge of these cannoneers and march them in rear of the battery.

Corp. C: You follow with the rest of the platoon. I will ride opposite the left flank of the column. Shoot to kill, if your least order isn't promptly obeyed.

Corp. A: Lead out.

A CAMP FOR THE NIGHT

Dispositions and Orders at Battalion Headquarters.

As soon as it was reported to Gen. A that the hostile battery had been taken over, he issued the following verbal order at hill 1250. Capt. D, battalion adjutant, who had rejoined the 1st Bn., 3d F. A., headquarters took down in writing such parts of the order as referred, or were of importance to his organization.

The hostile force has retreated toward Richards. This command will go into camp for the night.

The 3d Inf. will camp near crossroads 9 and outpost the line. Frisco R. R. bridge over Cache Creek—1186—1214—Adams Ridge, both inclusive. The 1st Squadron will send one platoon to crossroads 9 for duty with the outpost.

Other organizations will camp as follows:

2d Inf., in the area southeast of 1219.6 and east of the 1219.6-8 road.

1st Inf., opposite the 2d Inf., west of the road.

1st Bn., 1st F. A., between the 2d Inf., and Medicine Creek east of the road.

1st Sq., 1st Cav., between hill 1230 and Medicine Creek.

Co. A, Sig., west of the road.

Co. A, Engrs., in the open area northwest of Quinette Crossing.

1st Amb. Co., between polo field and the creek.

The field trains are ordered up the West Lawton road and will join their organizations.

Lieut. T, with his platoon will move the captured battery to Polo Field and halt there until 6:00 p. m. All prisoners, trophies and captured animals and matériel will be turned over to Lieut. A before that hour, when he will move toward Lawton, via West Lawton road, turn over his convoy to the line of communication troops and rejoin his command.

Lieut. Col. A, 1st Inf., will police the battlefield. He is authorized to call on the 1st Inf. for a company, the cavalry for a platoon, and the engineer company for its mounted detachment.

The field artillery will put a guard over White Wolf Crossing, keep the crossing clear and allow no watering within 50 yards of the ford.

Organizations camped along roads will see that the roads are kept clear.

Rations, forage, and ammunition will be at the parade ground, New Post, at 7:00 P. M. Field train and ammunition wagons will refill there at that hour.

All organizations will be prepared to march at 6:00 A.M., tomorrow.

Brigade headquarters will camp at crossroads 8.

Maj. A immediately asked the brigade adjutant:

We have lost some horses today. May I get some from that captured battery?

This request having been referred to the general, he said:

Take anything you want.

Maj. A thereupon wrote on a leaf of his notebook.

Brig. Hdqrs. Hill 1250

16 Mar. '16—4:30 P. M.

Officer in charge Captured Battery:

Turn over to the 1st Bn., 1st F. A., such captured horses and matériel as they may request.

By order Brig. Gen. A.

This he presented to the brigade adjutant for his signature.

He then walked over to Capt. C and said:

We camp this side of White Wolf Crossing east of the road. Move your battery there. I will show you your camp site later. Let me know within 30 minutes if you have any disabled horses that should be replaced.

To the agents of Batteries A and B and the combat train agent (all of whom were oriented with respect to their organizations):

Rejoin your organizations and tell them to move to the north of White Wolf Crossing at once where we go into camp. Battery combat trains will camp with their batteries.

Tell your captains to let me know promptly how many horses they may need to replace disabled ones. I will be at our camp site.

To his adjutant:

Let our headquarters detachment follow Battery C into camp. See if any of the headquarters horses are disabled. As soon as Battery C arrives at the ford, detail a guard to keep the ford open and allow no watering within 50 yards of the crossing. Send a scout up the West Lawton road to meet the consolidated field trains and conduct our wagons to our camp.

The major then took the C Battery agent, trotted to crossroads 8, turned down the road to the east about 100 yards, then south 200 yards, halted, and said to the agent:

Your battery will camp in line facing west, its right resting where we now are; the front of the battery parallel to the north and south road over

there. Tell your captain to unhitch, unharness, and go into camp. Kitchens and officers on this flank, sinks on the south flank. Your battery combat train is coming up to camp with the battery.

Maj. A rode on to the creek and observed that the banks were low. He then returned to the battalion camp site and dismounted.

Battery C shortly appeared and parked as ordered.

The major ordered the battalion headquarters detachment to camp immediately in front (west) of Battery C, and said to the adjutant:

We will camp just to the right of the detachment in front of Battery C. The other batteries will camp in rear of C taking the same formation facing west. Kitchens and officers on this flank. Sinks to the south. Water the animals 100 yards down stream from the ford.

As soon as the batteries were in park and the captains had had an opportunity to start their men making camp, the major assembled the officers and the 1st sergeant of Battery A and ordered:

The hostile forces have retreated to the north. Battery A has lost all of its officers except Lieut. A. 1st Lieut. M of Battery B is assigned to the command of Battery A and 2d Lieut. M of C Battery is attached to Battery A for duty.

We camp here for the night; the 3d Inf. is on outpost to the north; 1st and 2d Inf. camp just north of our camp. The Engineers are to the east of us and Signal troops across this road. The Ambulance Co., is to camp just south of the ford.

The adjutant will detail an officer of the day and a guard. One post over each battery picket line, one post at the ford to keep it clear and allow no watering within 50 yards of the crossing, and one post on this north and south road to keep it clear.

Reveille will be at 4:30 A. M., and organizations will be prepared to march at 6:00 A. M.

The field trains are coming up and after delivering to the batteries will park on the south flank of the battalion.

Capt. D: Give orders to the battalion quartermaster to have his wagons at the parade ground New Post by 7:00 P. M., where issues of forage and rations will be made.

All empty caissons will be reported, hitched, and with 4 cannoneers per caisson, to Lieut. L by 6:00 P. M., and he will conduct them to the parade ground New Post, where ammunition will be issued at 7:00 P. M.

Each battery send 4 dismounted men with halters to report here to me in person immediately. I am going after some remounts.

Capt. B: Take command in my absence.

DISPOSITION AND ORDERS IN BATTERY C

The C Battery agent dismounted and marked the point where the right of his battery was to park by sticking a tree branch into the ground, mounted and rode toward his battery. His captain had ridden ahead of the battery and when they met the agent saluted and said:

Sir, the major directs that the battery park in line, facing west parallel to the road. The right of the battery is to rest over there (pointing) where that limb is in the ground. He directs that you unhitch, unharness, and go into camp. Kitchens and officers on the north flank, sinks on the south flank. The battery combat train is ordered up and will camp with the battery.

Capt. C returned to his battery, executed *column left* and when he had gained about 150 yards to the east, executed *column right* so as to approach squarely the point where the right of his line was to rest and about 50 yards in rear of it. When nearly opposite this point he commanded: *On right into line adding march* when his leading carriage was opposite the agent who had returned and was marking the point in person. He halted the battery on the line and dressed it to the right. Capt. C then rode to the front of the battery and announced:

The battalion camps in this vicinity. We camp where we are now halted. Kitchens and officers on the north flank, sinks on the south flank. When our combat train comes up, it will park in its proper place on our left flank and go into camp. No officer or man will leave this park except by my order. Lieut. B will take charge of pitching the shelter tents. No watering or feeding until I order it. Unhitch, unharness, stretch the picket ropes on the line of caissons, and start to grooming.

Lieut. A will adjust the sights, quadrants, and other instruments before sundown, also inspect the matériel, make necessary repairs, equalize the ammunition in the firing battery chests, and fill up the chests as soon as the combat train arrives.

Chiefs of section and drivers will examine their animals immediately upon unhitching and report promptly to Lieut. C any injuries or horses needing shoeing.

A MARCH TO THE FRONT

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

The combat trains came into camp with B Battery. The field trains arrived about 5:30 P. M., distributed the baggage, kitchen outfits, rations, and grain. Dinner was served in all the

batteries about 7:30 P. M. Until nearly 11:00 P. M., every officer and man was busy overhauling the matériel, adjusting instruments and communication apparatus, refilling cylinders, transferring ammunition, reshoeing animals, making up casualty reports, attending to disciplinary cases, etc., etc.

At 9:00 P. M. the Chaplain of the 1st Inf., who was in charge of the mails, arrived from Lawton with a wagon load of mail and threw off a sack for the battalion. He also announced that he would pick up mail at 4:00 A. M. The mail was turned over to the officer of the day for distribution and the batteries were notified that outgoing mail could be left with the guard up to 3:30 A. M. Post cards, stamped envelopes, and paper purchased from the battery funds could be obtained without charge in each battery. About midnight a wagon load of baled hay arrived from Lawton and was fed to the animals by the guard. At 11:30 P. M. an order was received from Brigade Headquarters directing an officer to report for orders. Maj. A directed Capt. D to go. Capt. D returned at 12:30 A. M. and found the major and the entire camp asleep, except the guard. He awoke the major and read him the following order which had been issued verbally at Brigade Headquarters at midnight.

Our cavalry brigade met and defeated the hostile cavalry on the line Charley-Agawam this afternoon, forcing it back toward Cement and Cyril. Large hostile concentrations are reported in the vicinity of Agawam. Our field army advances on Agawam tomorrow, the left flank division through Charley.

The hostile force which we defeated today has fallen back and taken up a position south of Richards. The R. I. R. R. has been opened to Ft. Sill. The brigade will march on Richards early tomorrow. The cavalry squadron will move out at 5:30 A. M. and reconnoiter towards Richards covering our movement. It will get and maintain contact with the cavalry brigade.

Advance guard, 2d Inf., will clear 1219.6 at 6:15 A. M.

The main body will follow at 1,000 yards.

Order of march:

- 3d Inf. (less 2 Bns.).
- 1st Bn., 1st F. A. (less C. Tns.).
- 2 Bns., 3d Inf.
- 1st Inf.
- Sig. Co.
- Engr. Co.
- Arty. C. Tns.
- 1st Amb. Co.

The outpost will close in to the main road in time to take its place in column.

The field trains will follow at one mile.

Brig. Hqrs. at head of the reserve of the advance guard.

The major remarked:

There seems to be no necessity for disturbing the battalion now. Figure out just when we are due to march. See that I wake up at reveille.

The major returned to rest.

Capt. D computed on a leaf of his notebook as follows:

The advance guard is to clear Hill 1219.6 at 6:15 A. M. The main body follows at 1000 yards. One battalion of infantry precedes us in the column.

It takes up about 300 yards of road space. $1000 + 300 = 1300$ yards. Our camp is 900 yards from Hill 1219.6.

$1300 - 900 = 400$ yards.

Infantry marches at the rate of 88 yards per minute.

$400 \div 88 = 4.5$.

Theoretically, the firing batteries should march 4.5 minutes after 6:15 A. M.

They should be ready to march at 6:19.5 A. M. or say 6:15 A. M.

The combat train follows the Engineers.

The troops between them and the tail of our rear firing battery are:

2 Bns., 3d Inf.—road space.....	600 yards
1st Inf.—road space.....	970 yards
Engrs.—road space.....	150 yards
Sig. Co.—road space.....	150 yards

Total.....1870

$1870 \div 88 = 21.2$ minutes.

6:19 + 21.2 = 6:40.7 or 6:40 A. M.

The field trains follow the tail of the main body at 1 mile.

Arty. Combat trains—road space.....	500 yards
Amb. Co.—road space.....	100 yards
Distance	1760 yards

Total.....2360

$2360 \div 88 = 26.8$ minutes.

6:40 A. M. + 26.8 minutes = 7:07.5.

But the first hourly halt will occur before this and allowing a minimum of 10 minutes for this, the field trains will not start to march before 7:07.5 + 10 = 7:17.5 A. M. or say 7:15 A. M.

Capt. D then cautioned the guard to see that he was awakened 5 minutes before reveille and retired.

Immediately after reveille roll call, the major assembled his officers and gave the following verbal order:

Our cavalry brigade met and defeated the hostile cavalry on the line Charley-Agawam yesterday afternoon driving it back toward Cement and Cyril. Large hostile concentrations are reported in the vicinity of Agawam.

The field army advances on Agawam today, left flank division through Charley. The hostile force which we defeated yesterday has fallen back and taken up a position south of Richards.

Our brigade marches on Richards today.

The cavalry squadron was ordered out at 5:30 this morning to reconnoiter toward Richards and cover our movements.

The 2d Inf. marches as advance guard clearing Hill 1219.6 at 6:15 A. M. The main body in order of march is:

3d Inf. (less 2 battalions).

Artillery battalion (less combat trains).

2 Bns., 3d Inf.

1st Inf.

Signal Co.

Engr. Co. Arty. C. Tns.

Amb. Co. No. 1.

The field trains are to follow the main body at 1 mile. Brigade headquarters is to march at the head of the reserve of the main body.

Lieut. Q (battalion quartermaster) will take one scout corporal and two scout privates from the battalion headquarters detachment and go with the advance guard as our advance reconnaissance officer. The battalion will march in the following order:

Headquarters Detachment and reel cart (less details).

A Battery, B Battery, C Battery, firing batteries only.

The firing batteries will be ready to march at 6:15 A. M.

The combat trains will be ready to march at 6:40 A. M. and will follow the Engineer Company.

The battalion quartermaster sergeant will see that the field wagons pick up our baggage and that they are ready to march by 7:15 A. M. He will report in person to the commander of the train for orders by 7:00 A. M.

I will be with the battalion until we are in march when the adjutant and myself will join the general at the head of the reserve of the advance guard.

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS IN A BATTERY

After hearing the major's order Lieut. M, now in command of A Battery, walked over to his battery kitchen where the greater part of his battery was lining up for breakfast. He called the battery to attention and said:

The cavalry brigade of our main army had a fight yesterday afternoon between the towns of Charley and Agawam, 25 miles to the northeast of here, with hostile cavalry, defeated them and drove them to the northwest. Our main army will probably engage the hostile army some time today near Agawam. The troops we defeated yesterday have retreated to the north and are supposed to be just south of Richards which is about 10 miles north of here. Our whole command marches on Richards this morning. We will probably have another fight today. You have 20 minutes for breakfast. We will strike camp, groom, and water immediately after breakfast.

No hitching or saddling before 5:50 o'clock. The firing battery must be ready to march at 6:15 A. M. and the combat train at 6:40 A. M.

THE ADVANCE RECONNAISSANCE PARTY

When the major had finished giving his orders, the adjutant said to Lieut. Q:

You will get Scout Corporal A and Scout Privates A and B for your work today.

To his sergeant major he said:

Tell Scout Corporal A and Scout Privates A and B to get their breakfast in a hurry, saddle, and report to Lieut. Q.

Lieut. Q ordered his horse and hurriedly ate his breakfast, studying his map as he did so. By 5:45, he and his party were ready to start. He called his men to attention and said:

You all know the general situation and that we march on Richards today. Richards is about 9 miles due north of here up the R. I. R. R. It is not a town, it is just a siding and telegraph station on the railroad. The 2d Inf., which you see filing out of camp now, is to be the advance guard. After the 2d Inf., there will be an open space of 1000 yards and then one battalion of the 3d Inf. followed by our battalion in order: Hdqrs. Det., A, B, and C Batteries. Then the remainder of the brigade. We are to go with the advance guard today as the advance reconnaissance party. Mount and follow me in column of "twos."

Lieut. Q then mounted, took the slow trot, and rode north along the 2d Inf., which was now entirely in march, keeping well off to a flank so as not to throw dust on the infantrymen. As he passed along the column he said to his men:

This body is the 2d and 3d Bns. of the 2d Inf. They are the *reserve* of the advance guard. That is the general and his staff there at the head of the reserve and that is where you can find Major A a little later on. Ahead there about 500 yards is the tail of the 1st Battalion, it constitutes the *support*.

When they reached the support he again informed them:

You see these three companies constitute the *support*. Ahead, up the road there is the 4th company of the battalion which constitutes the *advance party*. That company you see has a couple of squads several hundred yards ahead of it, which is the *point*.

This gate here is Apache Gate and the end of the reservation. The creek to the right is *Cache Creek* and the high hills to our left are known as the *Ketch-Gear Ridge*. Ahead of us one mile, the map shows a crossroads and a store called *Cartier's Store*. From now on, all the roads run north and south and east and west at every section line—all one mile apart. Over

there at the head of the support is Col. B of the 2d Inf., the advance guard commander with his adjutant and their orderlies.

Lieut. Q then directed his party to take the walk, and rode forward to the head of the support where he saluted the adjutant of the 2d Inf. and said:

I am Lieut. Q of the field artillery battalion and have been sent forward by my battalion commander to march with the advance guard as an advance reconnaissance officer. I have three mounted scouts and an orderly with me and would like permission to ride here with the support.

PUTTING THE BATTALION IN MARCH

At 6:10 A. M., the firing batteries were hitched in and ready to march, the drivers and cannoneers dismounted and standing at rest; the combat train sections had just commenced to harness and the battalion quartermaster sergeant with one of his field wagons hitched was going about loading the baggage and kitchen outfits assisted by details from the combat train cannoneers. The other field wagons were not yet hitched, their animals being still tied to the picket line and eating hay. The major was standing near the northwest corner of the battalion park watching the 3d Inf. marching out of camp. As the last company of the first battalion of that regiment moved toward the road, he motioned to the sergeant major to move out with his detachment and the reel cart, and to Lieut. M, commanding Battery A to follow him. Maj. A remained in position until he saw all of his firing batteries in march, when he observed that each battery was taking all its officers with the firing battery and that the battery combat trains were each commanded by the battery stable sergeant, Sgt. S of C Battery, the senior, being in charge of the consolidated train. The major immediately sent his orderly to overtake Capt. A with orders to send Lieut. N back to take command of the consolidated combat train.

The major and his adjutant then rode up to the head of the battalion. As he passed Capts. B and C and Lieut. M, he said to each:

I am going now to the head of the reserve of the advance guard.

He then rode ahead accompanied by his adjutant, their orderlies, and two of the battery agents. He found Gen. A and his staff at the head of the reserve, reported his presence to the brigade adjutant, and took his place in column with the staff.

THE CONSOLIDATED COMBAT TRAINS

As Lieut. N passed down the column on his way to the park, he encountered the major who said to him:

There is no officer with the combat trains. You are to go back and take command of the consolidated train. The train is to follow the engineer company. It should be ready to march by 6:30.

When the lieutenant reached the park (about 6:20 A. M.) he found the harnessing and hitching well under way. He immediately called up all the non-commissioned officers and said:

I have been sent back by the major to take command of the battery combat trains.

The brigade is marching today on Richards against the hostile force which we defeated yesterday, and which is supposed to be in position south of Richards. Richards is a telegraph station and siding on the R. I. R. R. about 9 miles north.

Our firing batteries are marching near the head of the main body of the brigade in order from front to rear: A, B, and C.

The major is riding with the general at the head of the reserve of the advance guard.

We are to follow the engineer company in the column of march and will march in the order: A Battery train, B Battery, and C Battery, sanitary detachment at the tail of C Battery train.

As soon as we are in march, I want one caisson corporal from each battery train sent up to report to me and ride with me.

Stable sergeants report as soon as you are hitched in and ready to march.

Lieut. N then placed himself where he could observe his own command and the engineer company.

As it took the road he mounted and commanded: *Combat trains, attention. Drivers and cannoneers mount*, and by further appropriate commands put the trains in march in section column behind the engineer company.

THE FIELD TRAIN

At 6:45 the battalion quartermaster sergeant directed the senior battery quartermaster sergeant to start the drivers harnessing and hitching and went to report to the commander

of the train, 1st Lieut. T of the infantry. Lieut. T told him that the train would commence marching about 7:15 A. M. in the order, 2d Inf., 3d Inf., Field Artillery, etc.

The sergeant returned to the park, rode through it as soon as the combat trains pulled out, inspecting for any equipment overlooked, and then took post where he could observe the 3d Inf. train. As the latter took the road, he called his train to attention and by appropriate commands put it in march immediately in rear of the 3d Inf. wagons.

PART III—TRANSPORTATION BY RAIL

General Situation: A Blue field army of three divisions and an auxiliary division of army troops has crossed the Red River into hostile territory and is advancing on Chickasha up the east branch of the Rock Island R. R. At Waurika, Brig. Gen. A with a reinforced brigade was detached under orders to move up the west branch of the Rock Island R. R., keep abreast of the field army, and open up the railroad.

Gen. A's command consists of:

- 1st Inf. Brigade (1st, 2d, and 3d Inf.).
- Battery A, 2d Line Troops.
- 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
- Co. A, Signal Troops (wire).
- Co. A, Engineers.
- 1st Amb. Co.

Second line troops are following this advance in charge of the line of communications.

On March 15 the field army had reached the line Denton-Bray, the center (1st Div.) camping the night of March 15-16 at Marlow.

The 1st F. A. (light) assigned to the artillery brigade of the 1st Division is in camp one mile east of Marlow.

AN ENTRAINMENT

Special Situation:—At 8:30 p. m., March 15, Maj. A commanding the 1st Bn., 1st F. A., received the following verbal order from his regimental commander.

Brig. Gen. A's detached brigade reached Lawton today and went into camp there. Your battalion with filled field trains is detached from further duty with the division and will move by rail via Waurika and report to Gen. A for duty. 1st Lieut. M.D., Medical Corps, one sergeant, two privates, 1st class, and one corporal, Hospital Corps, with one pack mule (equipped) from the regimental sanitary service and Veterinarian V, are ordered to report to you and accompany your command. The L. C. troops will handle the movement. The railroad was opened to Marlow at 2:30 p. m. today. Brig. Gen. L with headquarters at Waurika is in command of the L. C. troops. I don't know who is in command of the L. C. troops at Marlow. *Your destination is to be kept confidential.*

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Maj. A immediately returned to his battalion headquarters and ordered his adjutant:

I want my horse, orderly, and the three battery agents, also yourself and orderly to report mounted at once to go to Marlow. Tell Capt. A (senior captain) to report to me immediately.

When Capt. A arrived, the major took him and the adjutant apart and assuring himself that they could not be overheard, said to them:

Our battalion with filled field trains is to move at once by rail via Waurika to join Gen. A's detached brigade. His command reached Lawton this afternoon. The adjutant, myself, and the battery agents will go to Marlow at once to ascertain the detailed arrangements. Our destination is *confidential*, so do not communicate it to anyone unless absolutely necessary and then very guardedly. Capt. A, take command in my absence. Hold all officers and men in camp. I do not see any need for mentioning our prospective movement to anyone in our command at present. Look over the field wagons and attend to anything that will expedite the movement. Don't let the cooks start supper.

At 4:00 P. M. Maj. A arrived at Marlow with his adjutant and the battery agents. The L. C. troops had opened an office at the R. R. station and Capt. R of the L. C. troops, who was in charge of the Waurika-Marlow division of the Service of Military Railways, was found in the office. From Capt. R, Maj. A learned the following.

Transportation was being made up at Waurika as follows:

Train No. 1 for headquarters and field train:

- 5 flat cars.
- 1 box car.
- 4 stock cars.
- 2 baggage cars.
- 1 day coach.
- 1 caboose

Total 14 cars.

Trains Nos. 2, 3, and 4, one for each battery:

- 6 flat cars.
- 1 box car.
- 9 stock cars.

1 baggage car.
5 day coaches.
1 caboose.

Total 23 cars.

Train No. 1 was due in Marlow at 5:15 and the others were scheduled to arrive at intervals of 15 minutes thereafter.

The trains for the movement of the battalion were to have the right of way over everything on the lines on the way to Lawton and rolling stock on the Marlow sidings was now being gathered up and moved to Duncan.

A carload of railroad ties and a carload of lumber found at Duncan would arrive at Marlow at 5:00 P. M.

There were two sidings at Marlow each about 600 yards long one on each side of the main line. It was Capt. R's intention to place trains 1 and 2 on the east siding and 3 and 4 on the west unless Maj. A had some better suggestion. The trains would be dispatched as rapidly as loaded in whatever order Maj. A desired. Through his field glasses Maj. A could see that the right of way ran through a cut north of the station and that trains 1 and 3 could load very easily from the high banks with the aid of a few planks. Trains 2 and 4 would be where there was neither a cut or fill and ramps would have to be improvised. The platform facilities at Marlow were negligible. There were some twenty or thirty steel rails near the section house south of the station. Maj. A told Capt. R that the placing of the trains was satisfactory and added:

I will order up the battalion at once to park as follows:

Battalion headquarters and the field trains opposite the east siding north of the station for train No. 1. C Battery opposite the east siding south of the station for train No. 2. A and B Batteries opposite the west siding for trains 3 and 4.

Please have the bulk of that carload of lumber and ties thrown off opposite where trains 2 and 4 are to load and a few heavy planks, say 15 or 20, and some 2 × 4's for wheel blocks thrown off where trains 1 and 3 are to load.

He then wrote the following message on a leaf of his notebook and sent it by Agent A to Capt. A. The agent was

directed to go at a fast gait and return at once to the R. R. station.

Marlow Station, Okla., 15 Mar. '16 4:10 P. M.

Capt. A, 1st F. A.

Move the battalion and field trains at once to Marlow Station, further orders for you here. Advise the command that we are to move by rail to another sphere of action. Report departure to Regt. Comdr. I am at R. R. station.

A,
Major.

The major then walked out on the station platform with Capt. D, his adjutant, and said:

The headquarters detachment and field trains will park there (pointing north of the station and east of the siding). A Battery west of the tracks opposite them. B Battery down there (south of station and west of the tracks) and C Battery opposite B on the other side of the right of way. All the animals will be unhitched, unharnessed, and tied to picket lines stretched to the trees, telephone poles, or fence posts and fed the evening grain ration before loading. The cooks will prepare supper ready to serve not later than 7:30 P. M. Explain to each captain what his transportation is to be. Caution them to inspect the stock cars carefully and make their own repairs. We will have to use what comes up. Tell them about the lumber and ties and that they can use that railroad iron over there if they want it. I will remain here at the station during the loading. The sanitary detachment will go on the headquarters train.

CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN C BATTERY

Capt. C was met by the battalion adjutant as he was approaching the station about 5:40 P. M. and given his orders. Train No. 2 at that moment was just entering the east siding and the C Battery agent came with the information from the major that this was the C Battery train and to commence loading. Capt. C moved his battery out of the road, halted it, dismounted his drivers and cannoneers, and turning the battery over to 1st Lieut. B, took 1st Lieut. A with him and rode along the train which had now come to a stop. The train was made up from south to north as follows:

- Locomotive.
- 6 flat cars.
- 9 stock cars.
- 1 box car.
- 2 baggage cars.

4 day coaches.

1 caboose.

The captain remarked:

There are enough flat cars for the carriages, and enough stock cars for the animals. The one box car will do for the harness, but we are short coaches for the men, however, the overflow can go into those two baggage cars.

Capt. C then ascertained that the train was in permanent position for loading, returned to his battery, moved it up and formed line facing the railroad opposite the flat cars and about 20 yards from the track and directing his officers and chiefs of section to report, gave orders as follows:

The battalion is about to be moved by rail to another part of our line. This is our train. We will commence loading shortly. Sgt. M (mess sergeant), the field wagons will drop off our kitchen outfit presently. Set up the kitchen over there by the fence. Cook supper and have it ready to serve not later than 7:30. Get out enough rations to give every man a lunch for tonight and for breakfast tomorrow. Put your kitchen outfits and breakfast rations in that head baggage car immediately after supper. 1st Sgt., you will take the combat train cannoneers and stretch the picket line among those trees.

Lieut. C, you will have the drivers unhitch and move their teams commencing with the ninth section to that box car where they will unharness and pack their harness and the horse equipment in paulins. Each chief of section will bring up two paulins with his teams for this purpose. You will use the first section cannoneers to pack and stow the bundles. The horses will then be tied on the picket line and fed grain. Post two drivers as picket line guard.

Lieut. A, you will be in charge of loading horses; and Lieut. B, you will be in charge of loading the carriages. A, you take the 2d section cannoneers and the chief mechanic and start work on ramps. B, you take the 3d section cannoneers and the carpenter mechanic and do likewise. This lumber and the ties and railroad iron are available. Lieut. D, you take the 4th section cannoneers and some carriage tools, inspect the stock cars especially for bad flooring, nails, splinters, etc., and sand the floors. When this has been done report it to Lieut. A. Then inspect the rest of the cars and report to me.

Sgt. S (stable sergeant), get enough grain from the field wagons to fill the feed bags after feeding tonight and have them stored in that head baggage car.

Nobody is to leave this vicinity and as quickly as any job is finished, the men will be assembled at the carriages of their section.

The first thing, each cannoneer will get his blanket roll off the carriages and each mounted man his blanket roll and saddlebags off his horse. These and the cannoneers' haversacks will be stacked in rear of each section.

1st Sgt., you detail a cannoneer as guard over this equipment.

Posts.

By 6:15 P. M. the horses were on the line and feeding, and the harness packed, supper was being cooked, the stock cars had been inspected and sanded with earth and sand from the right-of-way and some piles of brushwood and old lumber had been collected near the flat cars and stock cars for bonfires after dark. Lieut. D reported all the transportation in serviceable condition but no illumination or water in the passenger coaches. He reported a total of 140 seats in the passenger coaches. Capt. D directed him to have the water butts filled and to get two lanterns from the carriages for each coach and the two baggage cars. Lieut. A had a portable ramp under construction made from plank and 2×4 's, and Lieut. B had about completed a ramp opposite the middle car of the string of flats made with cribs of railroad ties and planking. Some of his men had removed the brake standards at the ends of the flats and others were at work sawing 2×4 's into 7 ft. lengths for blocking the wheels.

The captain now considered how he would assign his men to the train and finally wrote in his notebook.

Car 4 (rear of train):	Battery detail	8 men
	1st Section	18 men
	Officers	5 men
	—	
	Total.....	31 men
Car 3.....	2d Section	17 men
	3d Section	17 men
	—	
	Total.....	34 men
Car 2.....	4th Section	17 men
	5th Section	16 men
	—	
	Total.....	33 men
Car 1.....	6th Section	18 men
	7th Section	17 men
	—	
	Total.....	35 men
Baggage car No. 1.....	8th Section	17 men
	Q.M. Sgt. and Drivers	
	Supply Section	5 men
	—	
	Total.....	22 men

Baggage car No. 2.....9th Section 17 men
Mess Sgt., Cooks
Supply Section 4 men
—
Total.....21 men

Lieut. B now reported that he was ready to load carriages and the captain ordered:

Let your 3d section cannoneers go to their carriages and rest. Take the 4th and 5th section men, both drivers and cannoneers, and commence loading. When these men are tired out, replace them with the 6th and 7th section men.

When Lieut. A reported he was ready to load horses, the captain ordered:

Let your 2d section cannoneers go back to their carriages and rest. Take the 1st and 2d section drivers, any men you want from the 8th and 9th sections, and the stable sergeant, and commence loading as soon as Lieut. B has about half the carriages loaded. Water before loading.

Lieut. B assembled the 4th and 5th section men, including cannoneers, drivers, and non-commissioned officers, marched them to the ramps at the flat car, faced them toward the car in line and ordered:

We will commence loading carriages: The driver squads under their chiefs of section will bring up the carriages by hand from the park as I call for them and run them aboard that car here. The 4th section cannoneers under their gunner will assist in getting the carriages up this ramp and run them to the car I designate. The 5th section cannoneers will go with the chief mechanic to the car to be loaded, and assist him in nesting and securing the carriages. We will load that head-end flat first. Sgt. P (5th section), bring up the first caisson and limber, 5th section, Sgt. R (4th section), bring up the 1st section caisson and limber *behind* Sgt. P's carriages.

Lieut. B then took post on the flat car at the ramp and the carriages were brought up and run onto the car in the following order by Sgts. P and R under his direction:

1st caisson, 5th section.
Caisson, 1st section.
Gun, 1st section.
Gun limber, 1st section.
Limber, caisson, 1st section.
Limber, 1st caisson, 5th section.

Each of these carriages was run up the ramp by a driver squad so that its trail or pole pointed squarely across the car.

It was then taken by the cannoneers of the 4th section; each caisson and gun was turned so that its pole or trail was turned away from the direction in which it was to be run (for the flat car now being loaded at the head end of the train, the pole or trail was turned north and the pole of each limber for this car turned south); these cannoneers then ran the carriage to the head-end flat car where they were nested and secured as follows by the 5th section cannoneers under direction of the chief mechanic.

The 1st caisson, 5th section, was run to the head end of the head flat car, its pole pointing toward the other end of the car (north), the wheels resting about three feet from the front end of the car. The first section caisson was next run up in a similar position, its tires squarely against those of the other caisson. The gun carriage was run in next, its trail pointing in the same direction as the caisson poles (north) and the wheels so placed that no part of the gun or carriage touched the caisson. The limbers were next run onto this car, poles pointing in a direction opposite (south), the direction of the gun trail. The pole of the first limber (gun limber) was run under the right trail seat of the gun, and the wheels placed so that no part of the limber touched the gun or its carriage. The other two limbers were placed tire to tire with the limber next before it.

Care was taken to see that all the wheels were in line. Full length 2×4 's were then nailed to the car floor outside of the wheels to prevent movement sideways and a 7 ft. 2×4 in front and rear of each pair of wheels to prevent fore and aft movement. Another 7 ft. 2×4 was run through each pair of wheels over the lowest felloe and spiked to the 2×4 alongside the wheel to prevent jumping. Seven inch spikes were used. Blocking of the trails and poles was omitted for lack of time. As soon as the loading was under way, Lieut. B had one of the 6th section cannoneer squads come up to place the securing timbers in place.

The other cars were loaded in a similar manner, the store wagon and the battery wagon being placed like a gun carriage.

The flat car opposite the ramp was the last to be loaded and to get the last limber aboard, it was necessary to take off its pole which was replaced as soon as the limber was in place on the car. No chocking timber was available for the last car, so the carriages were securely lashed together and to the car with picket ropes.

Lieut. S carefully inspected his loading shute to be sure that the horses would have secure footing and that there was no possibility of their stepping between the car and the shute.

When the carriages were half loaded, he assembled the 1st and 2d section drivers and the 8th section cannoneers, the chief of the 8th section, and three caisson corporals and marching them to the loading shute gave orders as follows:

We will commence loading now, this car first. Sgts. S and T, have your drivers bring up the horses beginning with the 1st section animals. Sgt. W (8th section), you and (caisson) Corp. P get into the car and work there. Caisson corporals S and T, work here at the shute leading in. Privates A and B, you stand here at the shute, collect the halter shanks, and turn them over to the stable sergeant up there at the head baggage car. The remainder of you cannoneers stand by the shute here to help run the animals up.

A docile horse was selected to go up first. His halter shank was removed and Corp. S, taking him by his halter headstall, led him up the ramp and turned him over to Sgt. W in the car who without allowing him to stop, led him to one end of the car. The other animals were led up in rapid succession until there was no room for more, and Lieut. A ordered the door closed and fastened and the ramp moved to the next car.

In the meantime the men were sent to supper by details, the kitchen equipment and rations stored in the baggage car, and as soon as the last horse and carriage were aboard, Capt. C had the battery fall in and gave orders as follows:

The battery will entrain as follows:

Head baggage car, the mess sergeant, the cooks, and the 9th section; second baggage car, the quartermaster sergeant, drivers from the supply section, and the 8th section; head coach, the 6th and 7th sections; next coach, the 4th and 5th sections; next coach, the 2d and 3d sections; last coach, the battery detail, 1st section, and the officers.

Lieut. A will superintend the entraining. The senior sergeant in each car will assign seats as the men enter the car, one man per car seat as far as the seats will allow. Nobody will be allowed on the car platforms or to leave his car without permission. The car aisles must be kept clear. There

are two lanterns in each coach. They will be lighted and hung in the vestibule at each end of the car. I don't know where we are bound, when we will be called upon to unload, or what we are up against tomorrow, so I advise everyone to get as much rest as possible. All loud talking and noise will be stopped in each car 30 minutes after you go aboard.

The 1st Sgt. will make a detail of 2 non-commissioned officers and four privates for guard; these men and the chief mechanic will report to Lieut. D. and ride in the caboose.

Get your blanket rolls, haversacks, and saddlebags and fall in by section. A, put the men aboard.

The captain then went to report in person to Capt. B, who was now in command of the remaining part of the battalion (battalion headquarters train having left), that his train was ready to pull out.

A DETRAINMENT

ACTIONS AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

The battalion trains were dispatched in the following order about 25 minutes apart.

Battalion headquarters and field trains.

A Battery.

C Battery.

B Battery.

The derailment of one of the cars of the first train near Junction City on the west branch, north of Waurika, caused a long delay. During the delay the battery mess sergeants went forward to the locomotive of their trains and made coffee by filling the coffee boilers with water from the engine tender and turning dry steam into it through a piece of hose attached to the locomotive boiler. While held up here, the major observed an automobile with two civilians standing in the road and immediately ordered the adjutant to take two of the scouts, commandeer the machine, go on to Lawton to ascertain the situation there and meet the first train. It was 8:30 A. M. when the first section pulled into Lawton. There had been a recent fire there and the railroad buildings and platforms were destroyed. Capt. D boarded the train there with Lieut. Z of the L. C. troops who didn't seem to know very much about his duties. Capt. D had had trouble with his machine and had beaten the

train in by only 15 minutes. He had, however, learned that Gen. A's command had camped that night along Cache Creek between Lawton and Ft. Sill and had marched north early that morning. From the lieutenant it was learned that Gen. A had caused his engineer company to construct some ramps for unloading, the previous afternoon and evening, and that these were along the Frisco and R. I. tracks north of Lawton. The major immediately ordered the locomotive uncoupled and getting aboard with Capt. D and Lieut. Z, had it driven as far north as Mission Hill. Beyond Mission Hill the track had been torn up in places. A number of ramps and chutes were observed along both the Frisco and R. I. tracks at the cuts near Mission Hill and south of there. Maj. A had the locomotive run back and again coupled to his train. In the meantime he gave orders as follows to Capt. D.

You take this train, run it to the cuts at Mission Hill and unload, I will stay here and have the second section run in behind you, the third and fourth sections I will switch over to the Frisco tracks and run out alongside you and unload. Get the animals off quickly, feed and water them at those ponds we saw in the field near 32. You two scout corporals stay with me. I will come up on the last section.

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS IN BATTERY A

The major flagged Capt. A's train at the Lawton station and ordered it run slowly north of town and unloaded. Capt. A boarded the locomotive and had his train stopped just south of 32 with his stock cars opposite a cut where he saw a loading chute lying by the right-of-way. He got off and sent his musician to the coaches with orders to Lieut. A to detrain the men with their personal equipment and fall in on the west side of the train. In addition to the stock chute, there were some 2×12 plank, some railroad ties and some 4×4 timber, evidently recently placed there. As soon as the battery was in ranks, he went up and gave the following orders:

We unload here at once. Pile your haversacks, blanket rolls, and saddlebags in section piles right behind you and fall in again promptly. Pvt. B, you fall out and mount guard over the piles.

As soon as the men were in ranks again he ordered:

Driver squads, chief of section and cannoneers of 1st section, three paces to the front, march. Lieut. A, you take these men, get the feed bags and

halter shanks from the baggage car. Start unloading the horses. Feed and water over there at the pond. Put a man at the locomotive to watch for your signal and have the cars moved past your chute as fast as you empty a car.

Lieut. B, take the mechanics and the 2d and 3d section cannoneers and get the carriages ready to unload. You can start unloading just as soon as Lieut. A is through there at the cut. Call on me for more men then if you need them.

Lieut. C, take the 4th and 5th section cannoneers and unload the harness, lay it out in the section bundles along the road over there, the bundles a little more than team length apart.

Sgt. S (mess sergeant), get your rations and kitchen outfit out and pile it there by the fence.

Sgt. Q (quartermaster sergeant), go down there where the field trains are unloading and see about a wagon coming up here to get our kitchen outfit.

Lieut. D, you take charge of the rest of these men, let them stand at rest, and be prepared to furnish details as they are needed.

Everyone remember that the train is going to be moved every now and then. Look out for the whistle.

March off your details.

Lieut. A marched his men to the stock cars and ordered:

Sgt. K (9th section), take your men, unload the feed bags, pile them over there by the road. Send the halter shanks up here.

Corp. A, take your cannoneers and put the chute in place by that car.

Sgts. B and C, get at the car door and let out the horses, one at a time. Sgt. C, line up the drivers in single file at the end of the chute, issue the halter shanks. Each driver take two animals no matter whose they are and lead away promptly. Give them a minute or two to roll, then lead past the feed bags. Each man get two feed bags, line up over there in the road and feed the grain. Don't stop to get your own pair now, we will sort them out later. Sgt. K, go up to the locomotive and have the train moved by car lengths at my signal.

As soon as all the animals were off, Lieut. A had them arranged by section with their proper drivers and moved up to the harness piles where they were harnessed. The column was then moved out to where the personal equipment was stacked, and the mounted men's rolls and saddlebags were secured. The nosebags were then removed and the animals led to water in the ponds near 32.

Lieut. D sent the cannoneers of one of the sections in reserve to gather up the paulins and return them to the carriages.

In the meantime, Lieut. B had the timbers and lashings removed from the carriages and as soon as Lieut. A had finished unloading horses, commenced unloading the carriages, using

one gun squad on the cars, another to let the carriages down the ramps and three squads to limber them up and park them by the road. The cannoneers were then given an opportunity to secure their haversacks and blanket rolls, and Capt. A had the carriages hitched, sending the battery agent to report to the major that the battery was ready to march.

PART IV—A MOVEMENT WITHOUT ESCORT, IN THE ZONE OF THE ADVANCE

SPECIAL SITUATION AND BATTALION ORDERS

At 10:00 A. M. battalion headquarters, the field wagons, and one battery were ready to march. Another of the batteries was just hitching and the third would be ready in about 15 minutes.

A résumé of the information which Maj. A had acquired to this hour was as follows:

(a) There were two companies of L. C. troops in the north edge of Lawton with outposts along the line 24—Lockhart.

(b) A large force of hostile infantry and artillery had been reported in camp at Richards last night and a Red squadron in camp near Medicine Park as late as midnight. Hostile cavalry patrols had been observed about 9:00 A. M. by the L. C. outposts near J. T. Rogers.

(c) Sound of continuous artillery fire toward the north had been heard for the past hour.

(d) Gen. A had marched on Richards at 6:00 A. M. via the West Lawton Road and Apache Gate. His field trains were parked at the north edge of Lawton.

Ever since his arrival in Lawton, Maj. A had been seeking information and considering the situation and for the past 20 minutes had devoted himself entirely to a study of his map and the formulation of a decision.

His estimate was conclusive that Gen. A had marched north and was now engaged in a serious combat. His mission, this situation of Gen. A, and all other circumstances behooved him to march at once as rapidly as possible to join. If the general had marched at 6:00 A. M. and had entered an engagement at 9:00, he was anywhere from five to eight miles distant. With his fresh animals the battalion could cover this in about an hour.

The major was worried, however, about the hostile cavalry reported at Medicine Park last night and the cavalry patrols seen near West Gate at nine o'clock. A troop or more of cavalry could play havoc with his command on the march and at the very least prevent him from joining. A single hostile cavalry

patrol could by rifle-fire seriously impede his progress if not stop it altogether.

To ask or even to order any of the L. C. troops to accompany him was out of the question, even though he had authority over these troops. They would impede his march and were of doubtful value, at any rate when put on their own resources. His map showed that the route via the West Lawton Road—White Wolf Crossing—Hill 1219.6 was over high ground and very much exposed. The route via the East Lawton Road—Quinette Crossing—7—9 was along low ground and almost entirely under cover from both the west and east. If there was a crossing just west of the railroad bridges, the way could be shortened there and going over the high ground of the Old Post avoided. The major judged that his best course was to take the least conspicuous route and trust to reconnaissance parties to give him information in sufficient time to enable him to get into a suitable position if he had to fight. He considered that if his battalion were cut to pieces, eventually captured, or prevented from joining, his effort could not be criticized but under no circumstances must he be surprised. It was essential, therefore, that the route be not only thoroughly reconnoitered and marked, but that he should have large advance patrols well out on his left flank and at least one patrol out observing the right flank of his advance to give timely warning of any hostile troops. Until his command arrived on the battlefield, his captains would have little or no use for their battery details. This was to be a movement to cover ground rapidly and secretly; if the battalion had to fight en route it would be a plain case of unlimbering and opening direct fire. He would therefore be fully justified in augmenting his headquarters detachment by the battery details for reconnaissance purposes and in using his best officer to conduct the reconnaissance. It was also a case where the animals should be worked to the limit, to get through. The combat train must go along. If the march were not interrupted by hostile troops, it would be better to let these trains march with their batteries, but if the column were jumped and the batteries had to do some quick maneuvering, they would be a drag on the firing batteries.

It would therefore be better to consolidate them and march them as a convoy. The field wagons should join Gen. A's wagons at the north edge of Lawton. At 10:00 A. M. Maj. A assembled his officers, headquarters detachment, the battery details, and the battalion quartermaster sergeant and gave the following order:

Get out your maps.

We are ordered to join Gen. A's detachment which is operating north, up the R. I. R. R. He has the first brigade, the 1st squadron, 1st cavalry, a second line battery and some auxiliary troops. He camped here last night and marched on Richards early today. Hostile infantry and artillery were reported at Richards. Richards is about 15 miles due north up the railroad. A hostile cavalry squadron was reported in camp last night at Medicine Park, about 15 miles northwest. Hostile cavalry patrols were seen northwest of here near the reservation fence an hour ago. Gen. A's command is evidently in action now. We will march at once to join him.

The battalion will move north over this (East Lawton) road, through the Old Post and the road along the flats (6-7-9) just west of the R. I. tracks toward Apache Gate. Speed and concealment are essential, this is no time to spare the animals, we will trot wherever the road permits.

Capt. D (battalion adjutant), take two of the headquarters scout privates and report to Gen. A. Get orders and information and meet us. Move out now rapidly.

Lieut. A (a very efficient officer), take the A Battery detail and all the headquarters mounted men except the telephone corporal, and cover our left during the movement.

Lieut. B, you take the B Battery detail and cover our right similarly.

Lieut. C, take your battery detail, go ahead and mark the route. Now listen carefully. I don't want to go over that high ground at the Old Post toward Quinette Crossing if I can help it. The map looks as though we could strike in between the railroad and the Old Post, cross the creek west of the R. R. bridges and take that wood road toward the open flats to the north. Find out if we can go that way and be sure and post a marker south of the Old Post to let me know.

Lieuts. A, B, and C, the batteries will march in about 10 minutes. Under no circumstances must the battalion be surprised by hostile troops. Get me prompt warning of any hostile movement that threatens us. Move out now with your details.

The major then continued:

The battalion will march in the order: Firing batteries A and B, consolidated combat train, reel cart, sanitary detachment and veterinarian, C Battery firing battery. Each firing battery will march prepared for action, and each battery and the combat train will follow the organization in front at about 100 yards. March in double section column wherever you can.

The quartermaster sergeant will move the field train at once and join the detachment field train over there by Lawton Heights. I will march at the

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head of the column. If my musician sounds "call to arms," it will mean each battery for itself. Lieut. Q, you will ride with me. Get two of the caisson corporals from the combat train to ride with us and watch our scout parties for signals. The batteries will watch them for signals also.

At 10:15 A. M. the battalion moved out on the East Lawton Road, took the trot and maintained it until the bridge at the southeast corner of the Polo Field was reached. At the first road fork north of 33, a marker was encountered who rode with the major until the column came out at Polo Field when he galloped ahead. Just north of the Polo Field, another marker was met who reported to the major:

Sir, Lieut. C says the crossing near the railroad bridge is O. K. I am to guide you.

In the meantime the major again signalled the trot, each organization taking the Sitting Bear Creek Crossing at a walk and closing up at a slow gallop. This last marker conducted the column east of Old Post along the railroad, across Medicine Creek and up to 6 when he galloped ahead. In going around Old Post and in crossing Medicine Creek, the column was forced to take the walk again. When the head of the column reached crossroads 7, another marker directed it to take the 7-9 branch and galloped ahead. Just as it had progressed several hundred yards further, Lieut. Q, who was riding on the high ground several hundred yards to the left of the road, suddenly galloped toward the major signalling *enemy in sight*.

As he rode up to the major he announced:

Our scouts on 1219.6 are *signalling enemy in sight*, pointing to the west and yelling hostile cavalry.

The major turned to Capt. A who was beside him and ordered:

Go by the left flank with your battery and cover us. The rest of the battalion continues the march.

Capt. A turned and galloped off to the left of his column sounding his whistle vigorously and signalled: *By the left flank, march, guide right. Prepare for action*. At the same time the major turned to the right, well away from the column and signalled B Battery to continue the march.

Battery A had been in double section column and now ascended the slope in double section line, the cannoneers running beside the carriages and preparing them for action. Capt. A called to his executive to take command and galloped up on the slope followed by his musician. As he topped the rise, he saw a body of horsemen advancing over 1250. He halted and as his battery came up commanded:

Action front, limbers in rear 100 yards. Approaching cavalry. Fire at will. Commence firing.

Before any firing could be executed, however, it was discovered that the troops were Blue cavalry, and he ordered: *Cease firing, limber front and rear*; and took the road toward 9 where he fell in at the tail of the battalion sending the musician ahead to report his return.

SECURITY AND INFORMATION MEASURES TAKEN BY LIEUT. A

Lieut. A had at his disposal the battalion headquarters detachment (less two scouts and the telephone corporal) and his own battery detail. He was well aware that his men being armed only with pistols he could not successfully combat hostile infantry or cavalry patrols; that his function was to avoid combat and to get early information to the battalion of any hostile troops appearing on the left flank. It was obviously necessary that he keep in touch with the battalion.

He immediately mounted his detachment and directing it to follow in column of twos, rode rapidly via East Gate to the Indian Cemetery (one-half mile northwest of East Gate) where he halted and said:

You all heard the major's orders. I want you thoroughly to understand our mission. The battalion marches by that road over there which runs just this side of the railroad to Apache Gate which is on the north side of this reservation. If any hostile troops appear, we must get early information to the battalion. The battalion is going to trot and we will have to work fast. Sergeant major, it will be your duty to keep contact with me and the battalion and be ready to relay signals. You can probably keep track of the battalion by its dust cloud. Take the three agents to help you.

I am going to move now across fields to that knoll where you see the steel tower (Evan's Knob). Corp. S, gallop out and keep about 300 yards ahead of us. March on the steel tower and halt there.

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The lieutenant and his party rode rapidly toward Evan's Knob scanning the country ahead and towards the west. At the West Gate—Old Post Road, he pulled up and ordered:

Corp. C and Pvt. T, follow this road toward the Old Post until you have crossed the creek, then turn up the creek, and rejoin me at the steel tower. Go rapidly.

At the same place the sergeant major halted his three agents and remained in observation until he saw the battalion passing East Gate, when he directed Agent A to remain and find out where it entered the woods along the creek and then to rejoin at Evan's Knob. With the two other agents he galloped on to Evan's Knob. Upon arrival at the steel tower, Lieut. A halted long enough to send a man up the tower who reported no enemy in sight. He then moved to Evan's Knob proper where he halted the detachment under cover and examined the New Post carefully. Corp. C and Pvt. T rejoined here, reporting that they had observed nothing.

Lieut. A then said:

We will move now to that high ground north of the creek (1219.6). Pvts. A and B, you move toward the Old Post, cross the creek somewhere in that vicinity and rejoin me north of the creek over there (pointing).

Corp. A and Pvt. K, you go west of the New Post to that first hill (Medicine No. 1), have a good look from the bluff and rejoin at the high ground over there (pointing to north of the creek).

Putting out one man as a point, Lieut. A trotted via White Wolf Crossing to hill 1219.6 and then to hill 1250, where he waited for his two flank details to come in.

About the time the battalion had reached Sitting Bear Creek, Lieut. A was crossing at White Wolf Ford, and the sergeant major was halted at Evan's Knob. Agent A was galloping to rejoin. The sergeant-major was now satisfied that he could keep track of the battalion by its dust cloud, so leaving Agent A at Evan's Knob to watch the major's party for signals, he followed toward White Wolf Crossing. From the Polo Field he signalled Agent A to rejoin him, and moved to 1219.6. From this high ground, the progress of the battalion was steadily marked by a long dust cloud, and it was presently heard coming out of the woods near 6.

PART V—THE DEFENSIVE

OCCUPATION OF POSITION TO COVER A WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Since passing the Old Post, Maj. A had heard heavy and continuous rifle and artillery fire at the front and many wounded men were encountered making their way south from Apache Gate and W. Jones. Near road fork 7, Capt. D and his scouts and Lieut. B and his battery detail were met coming from Apache Gate. The captain said:

We have run into a whole division and are being badly punished. Gen. A's battery has been put out of business. He is about to withdraw and orders us to go into position on the ridge in our immediate front. There are at least three hostile batteries in position in the open less than two miles away. The brigade adjutant is coming right behind me.

The major signalled to the battalion to walk and said to Capt. D.

I will go on to the top of the ridge. You take command here. Send the captains to join me on reconnaissance. You have been over the ground, advance the batteries as far as you think best but not over the ridge.

With Capt. B, Lieut. B, and the B Battery detail, Lieut. Q, their orderlies and the battalion musician, the major resumed the trot toward the gate. Almost immediately he encountered the brigade adjutant who turned and rode with him saying:

We are up against a hostile division without cavalry. Our 1st and 2d regiments are deployed between the Gear Ridge and Cache Creek about a mile north of the gate. The 3d Inf., which has been in reserve, is going into position along the creek just beyond the gate to cover the withdrawal of the 1st and 2d. The general desires you to go into position on this (Apache Gate) ridge and cover the retirement. Our battery has been knocked to pieces and we need your fire promptly. There are no hostile troops on Gear Ridge yet. Our cavalry squadron is holding the gap west of Rabbit Hill.

As the party came out on the ridge at Apache Gate, the situation became immediately evident.

The 3d Inf. was going into position along the brook just north of the gate.

One of the blue infantry regiments was deployed across the open field with its right resting on the R. R. about 300 yards south of the Carter-Overton road; the other regiment was holding the east nose of hill 1396 and a part of the line across the meadows to the east with a battalion in close order near the orchard south of 1396.

Near Carter, two hostile batteries were in action directly in the open. Two more batteries were unlimbering near Overton and a column of hostile infantry was moving south down the Overton-Apache Gate road. Very little hostile infantry was visible in front of the 1st or 2d regiments. It was clear that the flanking column and the artillery near Overton would speedily render the position of the front line regiments untenable.

The major looked back at the battalion. Battery B had been moved by the flank out of the road and was now halted in double section line facing toward W. Jones about 300 yards northeast of 9. Battery C was passing in rear of B, and A was closing up on C. The combat trains could not be seen. Capts. A and C came up at this instant.

The major gave orders as follows:

Capt. B, go into position about where your battery is now halted, flash deflade. Attack the artillery near the Overton House.

Capt. A, you see that column of infantry moving south from Overton? Unlimber on the left of B Battery and attack it. Then help Capt. B with the artillery over there. Take flash deflade.

Capt. C, go into position down there at the road bend (just south of Apache Gate); attack anything you see west of the R. R.—the hostile batteries near Carters first. Take flash deflade.

I will be at the A Battery station.

In the meantime, Lieuts. A and C, with most of the battalion and the A and C battery details reported and the major ordered:

Battery officers and details report to their battery commanders. Sergeant-major, I am going to take post with A Battery over there. Get our detachment together over there and assign men to observe the front. I don't want any instruments set up and no wire laid. We will communicate by messengers. Let the reel cart stay with the combat train for the present.

Lieut. Q, find out where the combat trains are located and let me know. Tell the surgeon to establish his First Aid Station in rear of A Battery.

Capt. D now rejoined the major and was directed to report the battalion dispositions to Gen. A, and leave a non-commissioned officer and a private with brigade headquarters for messenger duty.

Maj. A then took post near the A Battery observing station.

A RETIREMENT BY ECHELON

SPECIAL SITUATION AND ORDERS OF THE MAJOR

At 1:30 P. M. the 3d infantry was entirely deployed along the line hill 1215 to Cache Creek, the batteries were still in position at Apache Ridge, there had been a large expenditure of ammunition and the battery combat trains had all been emptied and sent back to Lawton, the cavalry squadron continued to hold the gap west of Rabbit Hill. The 1st Inf. had been assembled and was being posted at Evan's Knob; the 2d Inf., badly disorganized was falling back toward New Post. For some time it had been apparent that the hostile troops were preparing for a fresh attack, and it was evident Apache Ridge could not be held much longer. At this hour, Maj. A was ordered to report to the general near the little hill 1214 and received the following order:

The 3d Inf. is ordered to hold until 2:00 P. M., then retire to Evan's Knob where we are taking up a position astride the West Lawton Road. Support the regiment until 2:00 P. M., then cover its retirement as best you can and go into position at Evan's Knob. Headquarters goes to Evan's Knob now.

The major returned to his post near A Battery considering the situation and his orders.

His orders gave him great latitude in some respects, but as a whole they would be very difficult to carry out. Clearly, he must get one battery out immediately to cover the withdrawal, and as he had been expecting such an order for some time now, he had previously warned C Battery (still in position near the road bend) to be ready to move at any instant to hill 1219.6 and cover the withdrawal of the rest of the battalion. He therefore signalled Capt. C to start and said to his adjutant:

Tell Capt. C the whole line is ordered to hold until 2:00 P. M., then retire to Evan's Knob. He must be in position at 1219.6 and ready to fire at 2:00 P. M.

Leave me the agents, you take the rest of the headquarters detachment, go to Evan's Knob, and select positions for us. At 2:00 P. M., A and B Batteries will start for Evan's Knob. Mark the route for me from Quinette Crossing to Evan's Knob.

The major then went to Capt. A and in person ordered:

Battery C is going to 1219.6 now. The infantry will hold until two o'clock when it starts retiring to Evan's Knob. At exactly two o'clock cease firing, limber, and move rapidly to Evan's Knob. Go via the road over the flats here and Quinette Crossing. Capt. D has gone ahead to mark the route and select a position for you. I will follow with B Battery.

Maj. A then went over to Capt. B's station and took post. By this time C Battery had gotten out, going as rapidly as possible via 9 and 7. At two o'clock A Battery limbered and departed and a few moments later the major heard C Battery open fire from 1219.6. In the meantime the 3d Inf. started its retirement. When its lines reached the reservation fence, Maj. A ordered Capt. B to limber and follow him. He then mounted and preceded the battery at a rapid gait to Evan's Knob.

CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN C BATTERY

As soon as Capt. C received his order to retire, he started limbering and then ordered his reconnaissance officer:

Leave me the two scout corporals and go to 1219.6, that high ground back there, and select a covered position. We are to cover the retirement of the 3d Inf. and the rest of the battalion which starts back at two o'clock. Get data for the most important target for immediate fire. I am going to take the battery back.

The captain then had his battery take the slow gallop and led it in double section column via 9 and 7. As he passed 7, he brought it to a trot and said to his two scout corporals:

Get up the bank there to our right and mark the route to where you will find Lieut. R, near the hill with the triangle on it.

When opposite the clump of trees in the flat between 7 and 6, he moved the battery by the right flank, resumed the gallop as soon as the carriages reached the crest, continued the gallop until he was under cover on the west side of the ridge, moved by the right flank into column again, and following the scouts, unlimbered south of 1219.6 in the position marked by Lieut. R.

Hostile infantry was in close pursuit of the retiring blue regiment and Lieut. R had data for a considerable body that

was approaching Apache Gate along the Carter road. Other portions of the hostile infantry were advancing all along the front. At least two hostile batteries had opened fire on the 3d Inf. elements from concealed positions.

Capt. C ordered Lieut. R:

Assign some of our detail to watching the retirement of our infantry and see if you can locate the flashes of those batteries.

He then opened fire on the Carter road column, dispersed it, and drove it to cover, then shifted his fire against a column appearing from the direction of W. Jones.

At first the retirement of the 3d Inf. was by echelon, the companies falling back in turn from position to position and firing at their pursuers but due to lack of any formed reserves and the growing intensity of the hostile artillery fire, the men soon got out of control of the officers and the retirement became more or less of a race for Medicine Creek.

More hostile artillery had come into action and started searching the area behind 1250 and 1219.6.

Capt. C ordered his observers:

Spread out on a wide front and keep an eye on the B. C. station, the senior man in the party notify the executive and keep the guns working until he can come up if I am disabled.

At about 3:00 P. M. most of the 3d Inf. had gotten past the high ground around 1250 and 1219.6, hostile infantry was about to occupy 1250 and a hostile battery was unlimbering east of Beef Creek where it could enfilade Battery C. Many of the personnel of the firing battery and of the battery detail were disabled and although the batteries at Evan's Knob had opened fire, it was badly adjusted and Capt. C judged he would be unable to withdraw his guns. He called the two remaining men of his detail and said:

Run to the limbers and tell the senior noncom I'm going to abandon the guns and to move toward Evan's Knob immediately with his teams.

The captain then ran back down the hill toward No. 4 piece, and commanded:

Gunners of Nos. 1, 2, and 3, take out your firing lock cases, remove the panoramic sights and quadrants and carry them with you. Run to the rear. Follow the limbers to Evan's Knob.

He then had No. 4 piece pointed at 1250 and ordered:

Target, the top of the hill. Fire at will. Commence firing.

After about ten shots had been fired, he ordered:

Cease firing. Take out the firing lock case and remove the sight and quadrant. Bring them along. Follow me.

Followed by the gun detachment, the captain ran toward White Wolf Crossing.

AN OCCUPATION OF POSITION BY NIGHT

ORDERS OF THE BRIGADE AND ARTILLERY COMMANDERS

At 4:00 P. M. Gen. A's command was disposed as follows:

1st Inf.: Evan's Knob and southeast.

2d Inf.: West of Evan's Knob, right resting on the road.

3d Inf.: In the ravine south of Evan's Knob.

Batteries A and B: Six hundred yards southwest of the Knob, in observation with observing stations at the Knob and in the steel tower.

Cavalry squadron: South of the stables, New Post.

At this hour the following verbal order was issued by Gen. A:

Hostile activities seem to have ended for the day.

Reënforcements which are being moved by rail from Altus to Cache and Hammel will join us early tomorrow.

This command will retain its present position until dark when it will take up a defensive position on the Grierson Hill-Hewitt line.

The 1st Inf. will take over the sector Grierson Hill-Corner 22, both inclusive.

The 2d Inf. will occupy the Hewitt nose, sending mounted patrols during the night to observe the sector Mission Hill near East Gate (inclusive), Evan's Knob (exclusive).

The 3d Inf. will bivouac in reserve north of the hillock 1170.

The field artillery battalion will go into position southwest of Grierson Hill prepared to open fire at daylight covering our front.

The cavalry squadron will bivouac near Dunbar Gate and observe the sector from Evan's Knob (inclusive)—West. One platoon will report to the 2d Inf. at 7:00 P. M. for patrol duty.

The engineer company will report to the 1st Inf. and assist in preparing Grierson Hill for defense.

The signal troops will bivouac in rear of the 3d Inf. and connect by wire the first and second regiments, the artillery, and the cavalry headquarters with my headquarters at 1170.

The ambulance company to south of 1170 for bivouac.

Organization commanders will reconnoiter their position before dark and report here for march orders at 7:00 P. M.

The field trains will not join the troops tonight. Use the haversack ration.

ORDERS AND DISPOSITIONS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Capt. D had taken this order down in writing. The major called for Capts. A and B and had the order read to them.

He then said:

Turn the command of your batteries over to the senior officer and assemble here mounted in ten minutes to go to Grierson Hill on reconnaissance. Capt. D, we will take all of our detachment that can be spared. Assemble here in 10 minutes. Send Lieut. A of A Battery here.

To Lieut. A:

The captains and myself are going to Grierson Hill on reconnaissance. You will take command of the battalion in our absence. It is to remain here in observation. Let the men have supper, using their haversack rations. No field trains tonight.

The major then asked the general for permission to send his horses for water, a platoon at a time, to the stables in New Post, where he had observed the cavalry watering. This was granted and the order was transmitted to Lieut. A to water and feed grain.

At 4:30 P. M. the major and his party arrived at 1244 on Grierson Hill, then rode slowly to the Hewitt place observing the field of fire to the east and north. At the Hewitt farmhouse they watered their mounts and then went west on the 22-Dunbar Gate road. Near the jog in this road, south of the steel tower, they halted, and the major said:

The battalion will be posted in this vicinity. Battery A is assigned to position in that swale making up toward the steel tower north of the fence and will cover the sector Evan's Knob Tower (inclusive)—west. Battery B will go into position just south of this road here at the jog, and cover the sector Evan's Knob Tower (exclusive)—south. Both batteries take flash defilade. The limbers will be posted at the west edge of that little clump of trees (300 yards southwest of the road jog). If our combat trains show up, I will put them in that first draw south of B Battery. I will establish my station at the triangle (1244) and lay a line to the battery stations. Note Arbuckle Hill, away off there to the east, also the steel tower at Evan's Knob and Medicine Bluff No. 4 as reference points. I will wait for you up at the steel tower. Report there by 6:30.

At the steel tower he met Col. A of the 1st Inf. who explained to him the arrangements for his regiment and the major pointed out his battery positions. At 5:30 P. M. the battery commanders and adjutant had returned and explained their arrangements, which were as follows:

BATTALION ARRANGEMENTS

One scout was to be left at the steel tower with two lanterns which the scout was to light and suspend, one about 10 feet above the other, half way up the tower as soon as it became dark. The compass bearing of this tower from Evan's Knob had been noted and recorded. As a further aid to finding the tower in the dark, a bunch of shrubbery had been tied to the wire fence due south of the tower. Battery B station was to be near the steel tower and the adjutant proposed to cut off 400 yards of wire from the reel, carry it up, and lay it by hand to connect that station and battalion headquarters. Battery A station was to be within speaking distance of the battalion station on 1244. The battalion observing instrument was set up and oriented at 1244 and a man posted in charge of it. The aiming point for the night was to be the same for both headquarters and the batteries, and was a lantern tied to a fence post near Dunbar Gate with a man from the B Battery detail in charge, to be lighted when he heard the batteries come into position. For a daylight aiming point, they were all to use the blockhouse on Signal Mountain, 6,000 yards distant. Deflections and ranges to various objects, including Battery Hill, Evan's Knob, West Gate, and the J. T. Rogers house, had been obtained and recorded.

The captain of the signal company had been informed of the location of the battalion station.

BATTERY A ARRANGEMENTS

The location of each of the 4 guns had been marked by stakes driven in the ground and the location further witnessed by branches fastened to the fence south of the position. Both night and day aiming points (same as the battalion) had been selected

and data obtained for various points in the battery's sector. Two men were to remain at the battery position with lanterns. Both of these men knew where the limbers were to be posted and had marked the route thereto with stakes a few yards apart.

The B. C. telescope was set up at 1244, and a man left in charge.

Similar arrangements had been made in B Battery.

The major then stated:

If we have the choice of our road coming in here tonight, we will move south along the West Lawton road until we are across that big ravine about a half mile south of the Knob, then strike southwest until we hit the fence and follow it up to the steel tower.

They then returned to Evan's Knob following the route by which the major proposed to move the battalion.

At 7:00 P. M. the independent organization commanders assembled at the general's headquarters and each commander was required to note on his map the proposed location of the other units. The general then ordered:

The command will start its change of position. The engineers, ambulance company, and signal company will move out first in the order named under command of Capt. A's engineers. Ten minutes after they have cleared this point, the artillery will march, followed by the 1st, 2d, and 3d Inf. in the order named. The cavalry will remain in position until further orders, patrolling north of Sitting Bear Creek. Headquarters will move to the steel tower in 30 minutes and all independent organizations will be reported to me there as soon as they are in position. The adjutant will remain here to dispatch the troops in the proper order and withdraw the cavalry at the proper time. All mounted troops will move at a walk.

Maj. A returned to his battalion and gave orders as follows to his battery commanders:

Close your stations and limber up quietly. I will lead the way. Order of march: Battalion headquarters and reel cart, A Battery, B Battery. When you get into your new positions, each battery will establish its own guard. The animals may be unharnessed and tied to picket lines, but they must be hitched in by daylight.

At the proper time he put his command in march and conducted it south down the West Lawton road for a half mile, then southwest to the reservation fence, and west along the fence until opposite the battery positions where they were directed to get into position in observation.

CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN B BATTERY

Capt. B, assisted by one of his battery scouts, conducted his battery to the rear of his position. Here he halted and having his chiefs of section dismount, took them forward on foot and pointed out their gun positions. The sections were then put on the line, unlimbered one at a time, and the cannoneers and chiefs of section of the firing battery directed to get their rolls off the carriages and their mounts.

Capt. B then said to Lieut. C:

Pvt. P here will guide you to the position of the limbers about 300 yards southwest of here. There is a little grove there and you can stretch the picket lines to the trees, unhitch and unharness and put the men in bivouac. You bivouac with the limbers. Be hitched in at daylight. My station is up there by the steel tower where you see those two lanterns. Detail 3 drivers and 2 caisson corporals for guard, put one post on over your picket line, and send the remainder of the guard up to my station to join the battery guard.

He then ordered Lieut. A (executive):

Have the carriages prepared for action. The cannoneers and yourself will bivouac at the carriages. The aiming point is that lantern. It is 800 yards from the guns. The battery guard will be at my station. I will attend to the guard.

To his 1st Sgt.:

Detail six cannoneers for guard and have them report at my station.

To Lieut. B (reconnaissance officer):

Bring along these men for guard to our station.

Upon arrival there he added:

The battalion station is off in that direction about 300 yards. When the battalion wire comes in, put on a telephone and keep the line open until further orders. You will be officer of the day tonight. Have the guard bivouac near our station here. Lieut. C is to remain with the limbers. I have told him to put a post on there and send up two drivers for reliefs and two caisson corporals for guard duty. Put out two more posts: one over our station here, and one in the firing battery. Do not lay our buzzer line to the battery yet. The general is going to receive reports there at the steel tower and there will be a lot of mounted men riding about here.

Capt. B then ascertained that his instrument was oriented, returned to the firing battery and in a low voice ordered:

Pass the word along to report for firing data at No. 4 piece.

When the executive, chiefs of section, gunners, and Nos. 1 had reported, he further ordered:

This battery is in position about 500 yards southwest of the steel tower on Grierson Hill, which I pointed out to you before dark. We are ordered to cover a sector extending from Evan's Knob, the place we just left, south. The guns are now facing approximately northeast. My station is near the steel tower. The limbers and led horses are off in that direction (pointing) about 300 yards. Battery A is north of this position about 400 yards distant. The major's station is about 200 yards still further north (pointing). The 1st Inf. is going into position in our front. You know the aiming point. I am going to lay the battery on West Gate, almost due east from this gun position.

Deflection 3,250.

On 1st Piece, open 10.

Site, 300.

Corrector, 35.

Battery right.

2800.

Do not fire.

Are there any questions? Posts.

Capt. B then returned to his station and as soon as the executive reported the battery laid, he called battalion headquarters and reported that his battery was in position, laid on West Gate and ready to fire. The battalion adjutant received the report and stated that the major directed that an operator be kept at the battalion phone all night, that the battery could fall out and get such rest as was possible, but the teams were to be hitched in and the cannoneers at their posts at daylight. Capt. B then gave additional orders respecting the night service at the telephone. A few minutes later he visited the firing battery, the limbers, and the picket line, questioned the sentinels, and finally returned to his station and retired.

DISPOSITIONS AT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

The reel cart and horses of battalion headquarters and of the sanitary detachment were sent with the A Battery limbers. The battalion station being near the A Battery station, no special guard was necessary. The battalion adjutant saw that the instrument was oriented and the line laid to B Battery. When both batteries had reported in order, the major went in person, dismounted, and reported to the general that he was in position.

There was no further information of the situation at the general's headquarters so, after visiting the B Battery station, he returned to his own and prepared to retire. In the meantime, the signal corps wire was run into his station and the signal corps man reported that he had communication with headquarters at Hill 1170. Shortly afterward, he reported that he was ordered to close station until daylight. Capt. B then ordered B Battery to get off the battalion line until daylight, arranged with the A Battery guard to awaken him at 4:00 A. M., and retired.

PART VI—AMMUNITION SUPPLY

GENERAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING AMMUNITION SUPPLY

The following, taken from the new *Drill and Service Regulations for Field Artillery*, will govern the subject of ammunition supply.

The organization and operation of the divisional ammunition service is the duty of the field artillery. Artillery officers must, therefore, understand the principles governing the supply of small arms ammunition as well as of artillery ammunition, and must study the dispositions suitable for the supply of the different arms in action. The principles are set forth in *Field Service Regulations*. Sound judgment in making suitable dispositions is to be acquired through the study of that part of the regulations of the several arms relating to combat and through the solution of tactical problems involving ammunition supply.

The conditions of modern war demand very great expenditures of ammunition. While such expenditures must unhesitatingly be made when necessary, it is the duty of commanders of all grades to see that due economy is exercised, and to make provision for timely replenishment of ammunition.

No means should be neglected for bringing up ammunition to troops in action and for keeping up the fire on the maintenance of which the success of the combat may depend.

The supply of ammunition is effected from the rear to the front. It is the duty of the commander of each unit in the ammunition supply system to ascertain the position of each of the units which he is to supply and to establish contact with such units. Troops engaged in battle must be kept free from all anxiety as to the ammunition supply.

The commander of the line of communications is responsible for the service of ammunition from the base to include its delivery to the ammunition trains.

The commander of divisional trains is responsible for the conduct of the ammunition train until it is released from his control.

The commander of the ammunition train is subordinate to the commander of trains until his train is released from the control of the latter.

Base ammunition depots are supplied from arsenals.

Advance depots are supplied from base depots.

Ammunition columns are replenished from the advance depots.

Ammunition trains are replenished from the ammunition columns of the line of communications. In exceptional cases where the rail or water heads of the line of communications are sufficiently near, the ammunition trains may be replenished directly from the advance depots.

Combat trains are replenished from the divisional ammunition trains.

The caissons of the firing battery are replenished from or replaced by caissons of the combat train.

Within the firing battery, ammunition is replenished as described in paragraphs 1060 to 1065.

An ammunition distributing station is the place to which combat trains are sent for resupply.

An ammunition refilling point is the place where the ammunition train is refilled.

An ammunition rendezvous point is the place to which ammunition columns of the line of communications are dispatched, and where they are met by agents of ammunition trains and conducted to refilling points.

The commander of the ammunition train is the immediate subordinate of the divisional artillery commander, after the ammunition train has been released from the control of the commander of the trains.

It is the function of the commander of a unit to which a combat train is assigned to regulate the supply of ammunition from the combat train to the guns and to send the empty caissons of the combat train to the distributing station.

Empty caissons of the firing battery may often be sent directly to a distributing station.

The ammunition train, as a rule, marches in rear of the main body. At the beginning of an engagement, the sections of the train are directed to proceed to stations from which practicable routes radiate to the combat trains. Usually the most suitable preliminary locations will be found at a distance of from 2 to 3 miles in rear of the line of battle. Inasmuch as the expenditure of ammunition will not be the same for all parts of the line, it is, as a rule, desirable to hold the sections together during the earlier stages of the engagement. As the probable course of the engagement becomes known, it may be advisable to subdivide the sections and to station the subdivisions at such places as will facilitate the resupply of the combat trains.

A position selected as distributing station should afford free access from all directions and ample space for posting the carriages so as to leave room for a third carriage to be driven between any two adjacent carriages, and should be so located as not to interfere with the movements of other troops or trains.

All routes leading from a distributing station must be reconnoitered and arrangements made for probable movements.

The commander of the ammunition train furnishes an agent to connect the field artillery commander's headquarters with the train.

Similarly, the commander of a section furnishes an agent to connect with the combat train or with the headquarters of the unit which the section is to supply.

The positions of an ammunition train and of its sections, when detached from it, are marked by a red flag during the day and by a red lantern at night.

General Situation: A Blue Field Army based on Chickasha and Anadarko has moved south along the Frisco R. R. and is in contact with a Red Army northeast of Lawton.

Special Situation: On March 15-16, the 1st Blue Division operating on the right flank of the Blue Army was camped

between Carter and Richards Spur. The field trains are with the division.

The divisional trains are organized as follows:

Commander of trains: Lieut. Col. A, 1st Inf.

Assistant: Capt. M, 2d Inf.

Train Guard and Military Police: Co. A, 1st Inf. and
Tp. A, 1st Cav.

Train Sanitary Detachment.

Ammunition Train.

Supply Train, divided into two sections.

Sanitary Train.

Engineer Train.

The Ammunition Train is organized as follows:

Commander: Maj. A, 1st F. A.

Assistant: 2d Lieut. A, 3d F. A.

Agents: Sgt. X and Corp. X, 1st Inf.

Sgt. Y and Corp. Y, 3d F. A.

Orderlies: Pvt. X, 1st Inf. and Pvt. Y, 3d F. A.

Two Ammunition Companies (1st and 2d) organized as follows:

First Ammunition Company:

Commander: Capt. A, detailed from 2d F. A.

1st Lieut. B, detailed from 2d F. A.

Agents: Sgts. C, D, E, and F, detailed from 2d F. A.

Corps. C, D, E, and F, detailed from 2d F. A.

Orderlies and Helpers: Eleven privates detailed from 2d F. A. The officers and enlisted men are all mounted.

Three wagon companies, each consisting of 27 wagons with four line mule teams and one spare team with a personnel of:

1 wagon master, sergeant Q. M. Corps, mounted.

3 assistant wagon masters, sergeants Q. M. Corps, mounted.

1 horseshoer, corporal Q. M. Corps, mounted.

1 saddler, corporal Q. M. Corps, mounted.

1 cook, private Q. M. Corps.

28 teamsters, privates Q. M. Corps.

The 1st Am. Co. carries 1,900 rounds of 3-inch, 864 rounds of 3.8-inch artillery ammunition; 1,222,000 rounds of rifle, and 60,000 rounds of pistol ammunition.

Second Ammunition Company:

Commander: Capt. A, detailed from 2d Inf.

1st Lieut. C, detailed from 2d Inf.

Agents: Sgts. V, W, X, Y, and Z, detailed from 2d Inf.

Corps. V, W, X, Y, and Z, detailed from 2d Inf.

Orderlies and Helpers: Fourteen privates detailed from 2d Inf. The officers and enlisted men are all mounted.

Three wagon companies, organized and loaded the same as the first company.

PUTTING THE TRAIN IN MARCH

The division trains, less the ambulance companies which are with the combatant troops, camped late on the night of March 15-16 at Richards (four and one-half miles north of Richards Spur). Reveille was ordered for 8:00 A. M. At 9:00 A. M., Lieut. Col. A, Commander of the Trains, issued verbal orders as follows:

The hostile army is reported in a defensive position on a line extending east from Arbuckle. Our army attacks, our division advancing through Lawton against the hostile left flank. The division marched on Lawton early this morning via the Carter—Apache Gate—West Lawton Road.

The field trains are to follow the division to the north side of the Fort Sill Reservation where they are to park and await orders.

The 2d Section of the Supply Train and 1 platoon of Co. A will remain in camp here.

The remainder of the trains will take up the march for Richards Spur at 10:00 A. M., in the following order.

Co. A, 1st Inf. (less details).

Engineer Train.

Ammunition Train.

Sanitary Train.

1st Section Supply Train.

Train Sanitary Detachment.

Tp. A will move out at 9:30 A. M. and cover the movement.

I will march at the head of the column.

Maj. A, 1st F. A., commanding the ammunition train, returned to his park, assembled his officers, and gave orders:

The Red army is reported to have taken up a defensive position along the line Arbuckle—and east. Arbuckle is that hill shown on your maps

about 6 miles east of Grierson Hill at Fort Sill. Our army attacks, our division advancing through Lawton against the hostile left flank. We march to Richards Spur following the engineer train.

Order of march: 1st Am. Co., 2d Am. Co. Both companies be hitched and ready to move at 10:00 A. M.

I will march at the head of our train.

Capt. A, commanding the 1st Am. Co., assembled his agents and wagon masters and in the presence of his assistant, Lieut. B, gave the following orders:

Agents, get out your maps. You wagon masters that haven't got maps look on the agents' maps. We are camped here at the south edge of Richards. About 4 miles south down the railroad you see Richards Spur. A little further south along the railroad and on the wagon road, you see a place marked Apache Gate and then the Ft. Sill Reservation. The division camped last night north of Apache Gate. Now look down on the south edge of the Ft. Sill Reservation and you see a place marked Grierson Hill. East from Grierson Hill about 6 miles is Arbuckle. The hostile army is in position with its left flank resting on Arbuckle and extending to the east. The bulk of our army is facing the hostile army and attacks today. Our division has already broken camp and is marching south through Ft. Sill Reservation and along that West Lawton road through the town of Lawton with orders to attack the hostile left flank. It is likely the division will have a fight this forenoon somewhere between Lawton and Arbuckle. The ammunition train is ordered to advance to Richards Spur. Our train marches at ten o'clock following the engineer train. Our company leads. Break camp at once. Wagon masters, start hitching at 9:30 and be ready to move out at ten o'clock sharp. The wagon companies will march in the order 1st, 2d, and 3d. Lieut. B, oversee the breaking of camp, the hitching and the formation of the column. I will remain here until we are in march and then ride at the head of the company. Are there any questions? Wagon masters fall out.

Now you agents pay close attention. As I said, we are ordered to march to Richards Spur. Any further advance will probably be to Apache Gate or into the Ft. Sill Reservation. Note that place, *Carter* north of Apache Gate. Note also that high ridge, Ketch-Gear. By taking the road west from Carter you can get through this ridge there at the Ketch farm and just west of Rabbit Hill there is another opening into the reservation. About the center of the reservation is Medicine Creek. This, I understand, is fordable anywhere, but if we have to cross it, look for quicksands. From Medicine Bluff No. 1 to No. 4, inclusive, there is no crossing. Between No. 4 and Rumbough Hill there appears to be a crossing, but it is probably not very good. West of Rumbough Hill there appears to be a good crossing marked Concrete Ford. East of No. 1 there appears to be a number of good crossings. Cache Creek, I am told, has very steep banks and there appear to be only two crossings, one at the O. C. W. R. R. bridge and one south of the R. R. forks. Beef Creek has steep banks also. South of Medicine Creek the country appears to be very open and with plenty of trails and

roads. Are there any questions: If any of you don't understand your maps or the situation, speak up now.

Sgt. C and Corp. D, you report to the major before ten o'clock as agents. The rest of you ride at the head of the company. Fall out.

At 9:30 A. M. Tp. A moved out, scouting to the front and flanks and leaving connecting files along the road.

At 10:00 A. M. Co. A took up the march followed at one-fourth mile by the engineer train. Lieut. Col. A supervised this start. Maj. A, commanding the ammunition train, took post, mounted, at ten o'clock where he could observe the departure of the engineer train and signalled Capt. A to take up the march in rear of the engineer train at the proper time. The 2d Am. Co. followed 100 yards in rear of the 1st. Both companies marched with 50 yard distances between their wagon companies and 25 yard distances between the sections. The captains of both ammunition companies let their companies file past, then took post at the heads of their respective companies. Maj. A likewise remained in observation until his entire train was in march, then, accompanied by Lieut. A and two agents from each of his two companies, trotted to the head of his train and took up the march. The rate of march was between 2 and 2½ miles per hour with ten minute halts every 50 minutes. As the column approached Richards Spur, Sgt. Y, whom Maj. A had detailed to accompany the train commander as agent, appeared and stated that the train commander desired the major to report to him at the head of the column. Maj. A turned to Capt. A and said:

I am going to report to Col. A at the head of the column. Take command of the train in my absence.

Upon reporting to the train commander, the latter said:

Here is a memorandum from the division Chief of Staff. Please read it.

1st Div. Blue Army,
Evan's Knob, Ft. Sill,
16 Mar. '16, 10:00 A. M.

Train Commander,

En route Richards—Richards Spur.

Hostile troops of all arms posted along LAWTON HEIGHTS. The division will attack in force. Attack orders now being prepared. Release the ammunition train and order it to advance to Apache Gate. Park the

remainder of your train at Richards Spur, holding 2d Section supply train at Richards.

X,
Chief of Staff.

The train commander then added:

Troop A has scouted through to Apache Gate and reports the field train parked near Carter. Part of the division has crossed Medicine Creek, the remainder is massing north of the creek. I will detach one platoon of Co. A to go with you. You are released from my orders and will continue the march to Apache Gate. The engineer train will clear the road in a few minutes. Ammunition train agents report back to your commander.

Maj. A directed Lieut. A, his assistant:

Have our train continue the march. Ride ahead, find the commander of that platoon from Co. A and see that he continues the march toward Apache Gate and keeps about one-half mile ahead of us. Take Corp. X, agent, and stay with the platoon. I will join you as we approach Apache Gate.

The ammunition train continued its march while Maj. A halted by the roadside and wrote the following:

Am. Tr., 1st Div.,
Richards Spur, Okla.,
16 Mar. '16, 11:50 A. M.

Arty. Brig. Comdr.,
1st Div.,
Evan's Knob, Okla.

Ammunition train released from division train and is marching to APACHE GATE. Head of column passing RICHARDS SPUR at 11:45 A. M.

A,
Major.

This note he read to Sgt. X, agent, and ordered him as follows:

Go on to division headquarters at Evan's Knob and give this to the Chief of Arty. Remain with his headquarters as agent.

When the head of the ammunition train was about one mile from Apache Gate, Maj. A informed Capt. A that he was going on to the gate, and with the two remaining agents trotted ahead. On the way he met Tp. A returning to Richards Spur, and was informed by the troop commander that the division had all crossed Medicine Creek and was apparently deploying for an attack, that a great part of the divisional artillery was in action, that all the area in rear of the division was apparently clear of hostile troops and that there was plenty of open ground for parking south of Apache Gate.

At Apache Gate the major met Lieut. A and with the agents and the infantry platoon commander went on to the hillock 1214. From this point all the area between W. Jones and the 1219.6-1250 ridge and the area west of Adams Ridge was visible. No troops could be seen. Heavy artillery and infantry fire, amounting to almost a continuous roar, was heard to the south. The major gave orders to the platoon commander:

I am going to park the train just south of the reservation fence near Apache Gate. Put out standing patrols here at 1214, over there on 1250, and at 1186. The rest of the platoon assemble near the road bend just to the northeast where I will take post.

The party then rode back toward Apache Gate and as it neared the gate, the major ordered:

To Sergt. Y.

Tell your captain to enter the gate, turn to the east, and park near the W. Jones fence there facing south. He will open several panels of the fence in rear of his park and put out standing patrols to the east.

To Corp. X.

Tell your captain to enter the gate, turn to the east and park facing south with his right about 50 yards from the gate. He will open several panels in the fence in rear of his park. He will send a mounted patrol to Hill 1215.

To Lieut. A.

Just as quickly as the ammunition companies are parked, make up a party of four or five men from their agents and helpers, trot ahead and locate the brigades for me. If you go via White Wolf Ford, then swing to the west to No. 1 or 2 Bluff you can undoubtedly locate them very quickly, and I suggest you do that. Return promptly, we ought to get the attack order very soon now; it ought to have arrived by this time. Look also for any combat train rendezvous and inform me promptly.

At 1:30 P. M., just as the 1st Am. Co. was going into park, Sergt. X, the agent who had been sent to Division Headquarters, returned with a copy of the attack order. He stated that the Chief of Staff had dispatched a division headquarters messenger with a memorandum of the order for Maj. A about noon.

The attack order was a typewritten carbon copy not very legible, reading as follows:

Field Orders,

No. 158.

Ft. Sill, 3-inch map.

1st Div.,

Evan's Knob, Ft. Sill, Okla.,

16 Mar.—'16, 11:30 A. M.

1. Hostile troops, estimated at two infantry brigades and one regi-

ment of field artillery, have taken up a defensive position on LAWTON HEIGHTS between LOCKHART and Crossroads 24.

2. The division will attack, enveloping the hostile left flank.

3. (a) The 1st Brig. will advance against the hostile front, its right flank directed on the HAZADAPHY farmhouse. It will not advance beyond WEST GATE until ordered by division headquarters.

(b) The 2d Brig. will move west of GRIERSON HILL and advance against the hostile left. The left flank of this brigade will be directed on Crossroads 24.

(c) The 3d Brig. will follow the 2d Brig. and halt near DUNBAR GATE in reserve.

(d) The 3.8-inch howitzer battalion will go into position in the draw north of 1193 and support the attack of the 1st Brig.

The remainder of the F. A. Brig. will take position at GRIERSON HILL and support the attack of the 2d Brig.

(e) The 1st Cav. will withdraw toward WOLF CREEK and cover our right flank. It will keep in communication with the field army and patrol east of LAWTON and toward ARBUCKLE.

(f) The Eng. Bn. will follow the 3d Brig. in reserve.

(g) The Sig. Bn. will establish wire communication between division headquarters and the Inf. and the Arty. Brigs. It will continue the wireless communication with the cavalry and with field army headquarters.

4. Dressing stations will be established at the EAST BARRACK BLDG., NEW POST, and on WOLF CREEK, near DUNBAR GATE. The field hospitals will advance to NEW POST.

Ammunition distributing stations at the PARADE GROUND and at HILL 1216, northwest of GRIERSON HILL.

5. Div. Hdqts. at Steel Tower, GRIERSON HILL.

By command of Major General A.

X

Chief of Staff.

As soon as Maj. A had read the order through, he said to Lieut. A:

Send the corporal agents to order up your reconnaissance party. Make it five mounted men from each company to report here at once.

He then spread his map on the ground and had Lieut. A read the order through slowly, both officers noting the location on the map of the various places mentioned in the order.

The major then considered his problem. Both the 1st and 2d Inf. Brigs. had undoubtedly issued their extra ammunition and their empty wagons should refill at once, the 1st Brig. wagons at Parade Ground, the 2d at Hill 1216. The 3d Brig. would not issue unless put into action, but if it did, it would refill from the Hill 1216 station, as would also the cavalry.

It would take 10 wagon loads to refill a brigade and the major decided that one wagon company would be sufficient for the initial stocking of the stations, 10 wagons to Parade Ground and the remainder of the company to Hill 1216.

All the howitzer ammunition should go at once to the Parade Ground Station and at least all the 3-inch in one of the ammunition companies to Hill 1216.

Lieut. A's reconnaissance party having reported, Maj. A said to him:

Take your party and mark the route via White Wolf Ford to Parade Ground. Send 2 good men to Evan's Knob to see what the situation is there and report back to me at Parade Ground. You go on to Hill 1216 marking the route. Then go to division headquarters at Grierson Hill and report to the Chief of Artillery and get me early word as to the situation. Ask particularly about our ammunition column. It was supposed to reach Stecker last night. I intend to leave part of the train just south of Hill 1219.6, and cross with the remainder at White Wolf and open the stations at Parade Ground and Hill 1216. Train headquarters at Parade Ground. You remain with the chief as agent.

To the infantry platoon commander:

The train is to continue the march toward Ft. Sill. Call in your outposts and march to the parade ground, New Post via White Wolf Crossing, at once. Lieut. A's party here will mark the route. Get through to the crossing as quickly as you can and put it in shape for the wagons to cross. Send patrols on into New Post if you are delayed at the crossing.

To Sgts. X and Y, agents:

Tell your captains that the train will continue the march to Ft. Sill immediately in double column. Both companies will lead out at once following this road toward 9 (pointing), the 1st Co. on the left (east), the 2d Co. on the right (west). The 2d Co. will march with the howitzer section leading. Rejoin me.

The major then conducted the column via 9 and Hill 1219.6. As soon as both companies were in march, he called up the two captains and oriented them fully as to the situation. At 1219.6 he gave them the following order:

The 1st Co. will detach two wagon companies of small arms ammunition which will join the 2d Co.

The 2d Co. will detach its howitzer ammunition section which will join the 1st Co. The 2d Co. will then park southwest of this Hill 1219.6. Capt. B, you can feed and water, but be ready to move on short notice.

The 1st Co. will continue to Parade Ground. Lieut. A is marking the route there. I am going on to Parade Ground.

With his 4 agents the major rode ahead. White Wolf Crossing was badly cut up but passable. At Parade Ground he met the infantry platoon commander, who had assembled his platoon near the northeast corner, and who reported that he had patrols out near the west end of New Post, toward Evan's Knob and in the woods to the east. Maj. A noted one ambulance company parked near the east barrack, but no combat train transport was visible.

One of Lieut. A's markers joined him and reported that Lieut. A had sent two men to Evan's Knob and that the lieutenant had gone off to the west of New Post.

While waiting for the train to come up, the two men sent to Evan's Knob returned, and reported that 18 empty combat wagons of the 1st Inf Brig. were parked on the flat east of the Knob in charge of a sergeant; that they had told the sergeant an ammunition distributing station was about to be established on the Parade Ground and that if he moved his wagons there, they could be refilled. The sergeant had not made up his mind what to do when they left. They also reported that the combat train of the howitzer battalion of the 2d F. A., which was in action about one-half mile south of Evan's Knob, was parked northwest of Evan's Knob but that the train had not been emptied. The major ordered:

You two men go back. Pvt. A, you go to the howitzer battalion combat train and tell the combat train commander that the howitzer ammunition wagons of our train will be parked there in front of that building (East Apartment) and that he can refill there. Tell him also that I will send our wagons to his park if he so desires, and if he does, you report back here. Pvt. B, you find those 1st Inf. Brig. combat wagons and tell the sergeant in charge that if he has no orders to do otherwise to move his wagons to Parade Ground here where he can refill. You remain with him and guide his train to a point opposite that set of field officers' quarters over there.

As the 1st Am. Co. approached, Maj. A met Capt. A and ordered:

This is Parade Ground, New Post. Have your howitzer ammunition section park just south of the buildings there at the east end of the parade and ten wagons of small arms just south of that set of field officers' quarters. Leave your lieutenant in charge here. With the remainder of your company, turn to the west along this road in front of these officers' quarters, go on to Hill 1216, which is about 2 miles southwest of here and open the station

there. Lieut. A is marking the route to 1216. Let me know the situation there as soon as you can. Send any markers belonging to the 2d Co. that you may pick up, back here to Parade Ground.

He then ordered the infantry platoon commander:

Send one squad under a non-com to go with the 1st Am. Co. It will report to Capt. A.

Have another squad go back via White Wolf Ford and report to Capt. B, who is parking his train near that Hill 1219.6.

You and the remainder of your platoon remain on duty here.

TRANSFERRING AMMUNITION

Lieut. B, left in charge of the Parade Ground distributing station, had the wagons of howitzer ammunition parked facing south in column about 5 yards apart south of the quarters at the east end of the parade, and the infantry ammunition wagons similarly in front of the set of field officers' quarters farther west up the line, both parks well clear of the road. The empty combat wagons of the 1st Brig. were shortly observed approaching. The lieutenant met them, conducted them in rear of the park, and had them pull up, each empty wagon alongside one of the loaded wagons. He then consolidated all the helpers from the howitzer wagons, infantry wagons, and the combat train wagons, formed them into working parties and started the transfer of the boxes. As soon as the transfer was completed, pursuant to the major's orders, the empty wagons were sent under an assistant wagon master to water at Medicine Creek and go into park with the 2d Co. at 1219.6.

FURTHER OPERATIONS OF THE TRAIN

About 4:00 P. M. the following was received from Lieut A:

To C. O.

Am. Tr.

Hdqtrrs. 1st Div.

Grierson Hill, Okla.

16 Mar. '16—3:30 P. M.

Both attacking brigades are making small headway. The 1st Brig. appears stalled on the West Gate line and the 2d Brig. is using the regimental reserves to get past the Dixon House. All the artillery is in action and firing intermittently. The Chief says the ammunition column is supposed to have made an early march today under orders to get to Richards Spur tonight.

A,

Lieut.

At 4:30 P. M. the following from the 1st Co.

C. O. 1st Co., 1st Div., Am. Tr.,
Hill 1216, Ft. Sill, Okla.,
Am. Tr. 16 Mar. '16—4:00 P. M.
Send me more 3-inch ammunition without delay. Am starting train of empties back via White Wolf.

A,
Capt.

At the same time two men from the 2d Co. arrived and reported that they had been sent by Capt. B to investigate the crossing west of Mission Hill. They had gone via Mission Hill and between No. 4 Bluff and Rumbough Hill and reported that the route was practicable.

The major wrote at the bottom of the message from Capt. A:

C. O. 2d Co. 1st Div. Am. Tr.,
New Post, Ft. Sill,
4:10 P. M.

Forward the remainder of your 3-inch ammunition to Hill 1216 via the MISSION HILL crossing. I will probably order all empties to march to the rear at 6:00 P. M.

A,
Major.

This message was read to the two 2d Co. scouts who were ordered to return to their company via White Wolf and deliver it to Capt. B.

At 4:30 P. M. the major received the following message from Capt. B:

2d Co., 1st Div., Am. Tr.,
C. O. 1st Div., Am. Tr., ½ mile S. W. Hill 1219.6, Ft. Sill,
Parade Ground, New Post. 16 Mar. '16—4:00 P. M.

My company is parked at this place. Have fed and watered animals and will have served hot supper to men by 5:00 P. M. My scouts report a practicable route to Hill 1216 from here south of MISSION HILL and between BLUFF No. 4 and RUMBROUGH HILL.

B,
Capt.

Between four and five o'clock, the howitzer ammunition was all issued to empty caissons that reported from time to time, except 2 wagon loads, and at 5:00 P. M. the major ordered these wagons to empty their contents on the ground and join the train of empties at Capt. B's park. At the same time he sent Capt. B this message.

C. O. 2d Co.,
Hill 1219.6

Am. Tr., 1st Div.,
Ft. Sill, Okla.,
16 Mar. '16—5:10 P. M.

Have all the animals of the empty wagons fed and watered and start the empties back toward RICHARDS SPUR by 7:00 P. M. at the latest. The ammunition column is supposed to be marching from STECKER to RICHARDS SPUR today. Put your lieutenant in charge of the empties and direct him to refill and return to the front at the earliest practicable moment, before daylight if possible. He will load 75% of his cargo 3-inch and 25% 3.8-inch artillery ammunition.

A,
Major.

At 6:00 P. M. a motorcycle messenger arrived with a verbal message from Capt. K, commanding the ammunition column, to the effect that the column had marched from Stecker at 4:00 A. M. under orders to advance to Ft. Sill; that at 3:00 P. M. when the messenger left the column between Richards and Richards Spur, the animals were in very bad shape and Capt. K was very much in doubt as to whether he could get through. As the motorcycle messenger was under orders to return, Maj. A had an agent mount behind him and take him to Capt. B's park, where the messenger was to confer with the lieutenant going back with the empties, get his supper and return to the ammunition column.

From time to time, reports were received from Lieut. A at division headquarters regarding the progress of the action. These reports were not of a favorable nature to the Blues. Before dark, the major moved his headquarters to Capt. B's station near 1219.6, notifying Capt. A and artillery brigade headquarters.

At 8:00 P. M. the troops were ordered to bivouac in position, and Lieut. A reported that the division was to resume the attack at daylight with the 3d Brig. put in. The latest reports showed that the firing batteries had about 100 rounds per gun left and that resupply during the night was imperative. At this time there were some 20 wagons loaded with calibre 30 ammunition at Capt. A's station and five at Parade Ground. The major ordered them unloaded and the empties consolidated at 1219.6 to be sent immediately to the rear under a wagon master with order to refill from the column with artillery ammunition. At

the same time he ordered an entire company of small arms forward, one of its sections to Parade Ground and two sections to Hill 1216. At 10:00 P. M. a mounted messenger arrived from Lieut. C, in charge of empties, with the following note:

Empty Section, Am. Tr.,
Carter, Okla.,
16 Mar. '16—9:00 P. M.

C. O. Am. Tr.,
S. W. Hill 1219.6

I met the ammunition column near this place, where we have opened a refilling point. Expect to be loaded and start for front by 11:00 P. M. Will load approximately 2,500 rounds 3-inch and 600 rounds 3.8-inch. The ammunition column is reported strewn along the road all the way back to RICHARDS, but is slowly coming in. Its commander reports he cannot advance further tonight and will maintain this as a refilling point. His headquarters is at CARTER'S STORE.

C,
Lieut.

The messenger reported that he had passed the second train of empties going north near Apache Gate.

Maj. A then wrote the following, making duplicate copies and sending one by messenger via the Parade Ground, the other via the Hill 1216 distributing stations:

Hdqtrs. Am. Tr., 1st Div.,
S. W. Hill 1219.6,
16 Mar. '16—10:15 P. M.

Arty. Comdr., 1st Div.,
Grierson Hill.

Ammunition refilling point opened CARTER'S STORE at 9:00 P. M. I expect to deliver 600 rounds 3.8-inch at PARADE GROUND and 2,500 rounds 3-inch at Hill 1216 about 1:00 A. M. tonight and a further supply before daylight.

A,
Major.

The major then personally stationed two agents at 1219.6 to intercept Lieut. C's train when it returned from the refilling point and to notify him of its approach. This train was reported approaching about midnight. The major met it in person and directed the entire column to continue its march across White Wolf Ford to Parade Ground where the howitzer wagons were to halt, the 3-inch wagons to continue to Hill 1216.

* * * * *

The Blue army renewed its attack on the 17th but failed to secure a decision, and hostile reënforcements approaching early on the 18th, confidential orders were issued at 8:00 A. M. to

prepare for a general retirement to the Elgin-Richards Spur line.

1st Div. orders received by Maj. A at 9:00 A. M. directed the ammunition train to empty at its two distributing stations, load with wounded from the field hospitals at Ft. Sill and march to Elgin via the steel bridge at 1:00 P. M.

At the time of the receipt of the orders, about 50% of the ammunition train transport was permanently out of commission due to loss of mules, damage to wagons, and missing personnel. Capt. A, with most of his remaining transport, was at Hill 1216, while Capt. B's remaining transport was part at Parade Ground and part at Hill 1219.6.

The major gave Capt. B verbal orders as follows:


We are ordered to unload and move the wounded from the field hospitals at Ft. Sill to Elgin, marching via Steel Bridge at 1:00 P. M. Send the remainder of your 3-inch to Hill 1216 and unload, the remainder of your 3.8-inch and small arms to Parade Ground and unload, assemble your transport at Parade Ground and wait orders. I will join you there.


To Capt. A he sent the following written message:

We are ordered to unload and move the wounded from Ft. Sill hospitals to Elgin marching from Ft. Sill at 1:00 P. M. Unload at once and move all your transport to Parade Ground, Ft. Sill, where you will get further orders.

The major then assembled his remaining agents and orderlies and rode to Ft. Sill to confer with the Director of the Field Hospitals.

L.V.,





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